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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to show that 
ideology acted as a motive force of significant importance 
on political action in the 1950s. The argument is not 
general; instead, it is specifically limited to the British 
Labour party during the years from 1951 to 1959. It thus 
covers the life span of only two parliaments.
It will be maintained in Chapter II that the important 
socialist theories, dealt with in Chapter I, were the pri­
mary base upon which the rival party factions, fundamental­
ists and revisionists, formulated their desired policy aims. 
In Chapter III it will be argued that these factions were 
able to influence the party leadership to a significant 
degree. The analysis will show that the policy of a major 
Western political party was heavily influenced by pre­
viously formulated theories and ideologies.
Ill
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INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable in recent years among socio­
logists and political scientists of the behavioral persuasion 
to deprecate the influence of ideology on political action. 
Over the last decade several works have been published which 
deal extensively with what their authors see as the end of 
ideological influence on political action in the West. The 
theorists responsible for this argument first became promi­
nent in the mid-1950's. Edward Shils’ article, "The End of 
Ideology?" published in the Nov., 1955 issue of Encounter 
and Lewis Feuer's article, "Beyond Ideology" published in 
the same year reached almost identical conclusions.^ Shils' 
essay resulted from "The Future of Freedom" Conference held 
in Milan, Italy in Sept. of 1955 under the auspices of the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom. It was attended by various 
intellectuals and politicians from North America and Europe.
The ideological issues dividing left and right had 
been reduced [by the majority of those attending 
the conference] to a little more or a little less 
government ownership and economic planning. No one 
seemed to believe that it really made much dif­
ference which political party controlled the domes­
tic policy of individual n a t i o n s .2
The reasons given for the decline of ideological influence 
centered around man's proven ability to solve the political
1 Encounter. 5 (Nov., 1955), 52-58. and Psychoanalysis 
and Ethics (Springfield, 1955), 126-130.
2 S.M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1963), p. 4kl.
1
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and social problems of the Industrial Revolution. Such fac­
tors as the conservative acceptance of the Welfare State, the 
decline of class distinctions, and the reduction of economic 
inequalities and privileges are examples of the factors cited 
as being at work. Daniel Bell has argued along similar lines:
In the Western world, therefore, there is today a 
rough consensus ... on political issues: the ac­
ceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of 
decentralized power; a system of mixed economy 
and of political pluralism ... the ideological 
age has ended.3
The purpose of this thesis is very limited in scope when 
compared with that of the theory dealt with above; although 
it does have as its object the desire to discover whether 
ideology had any influence on policy formation in the 1950s. 
The argument is not general; instead, it is specifically 
limited to the British Labour party during the years from 1951 
to 1959. It thus covers the life span of only two parlia­
ments. The argument presented is in no way meant to be a 
total refutation of the general "End of Ideology" theory. In­
stead, its purpose is simply to show that ideological in­
fluences on policy formation were, in this one case, of sig­
nificant importance. It will be maintained that the general 
socialist theories dealt with in the early sections were the 
primary base upon which the rival factions in the party 
formulated their desired policy aims. It will be further 
argued that these factions were able to influence the party
3 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, I962) p.
402.
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leadership and, as a result, the official policy of the 
party; thus illustrating that the policy of a major Western 
political party was heavily influenced by previously formu­
lated theories and ideologies.^
4 The policies of the factions, the revisionists and 
fundamentalists, are dealt with, at length, in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER I
THE LABOUR PARTY AND SOCIALIST THEORY
The passage of time inevitably distorts the commentator's 
understanding of political ideas as a result of cultural and 
group socialization. Yet, at the same time, it aids analysis 
by providing a conceptual frameworm and a certain amount of 
detachment. The political theorist himself is limited in a 
similar way; he is at the same time moulded by and the mould­
er of his environment. And, as a result, his primary aim is 
often the justification of a specific policy; only then comes 
statistical and historical evidence in support. Although it 
has become fashionable since the publication of David Easton's 
The Political System in 1953 to decry historicism in politi­
cal theory, it is not unprofitable for the commentator to 
attempt to isolate core ideas and examine them in their re­
lation to given circumstances, as well as using them as a 
tool of analysis in determining one's own moral preconceptions 
or determining the validity of the theory.^ Ideas can serve 
as a primary motive force in political activity and any at­
tempt to isolate the causes of such activity must, of neces­
sity, include a certain type of research which Easton would 
lable historical.
"The power of the philosopher lies in that he can stir 
up great waves of feeling and agitation. His helplessness
5 New York, 1953.
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is due to his inability to control the farther waves of his 
thought."^ As an instrument of historical causality a theory 
becomes important when emotions and interests can be given 
shape and support through it. There is no guarantee that the 
most logical or best suited theory will find large scale ac­
ceptance, Instead, influence on political action depends on 
the theory's appeal to ethical needs. When such comes to be 
the case the theory tends to become an ideology and this leads 
to a significant increase in its influence on political be­
havior.^ The degree of influence of any ideology is a func­
tion of its ability to enlist support and this, in turn, is a 
function of organization.
British Socialism provides a relevant area for the study 
of political theory in this light. The connection here be­
tween theory and influence is striking. No attempt will be 
made to give a critique of various theories; information as 
to where such analysis can be found is provided in several 
notes. Rather, an attempt will be made to trace the develop­
ment of socialist thought from the latter half of the nine­
teenth century to the mid-twentieth century and to isolate the 
core of the theories. Secondly, an attempt will be made to
6 Adam.Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English 
Socialism (Cambridge, Mass., I951), p. 130.
7 Ideology is here defined as a pattern of beliefs which 
imply an end for political action and which require an ir­
rational commitment to certain ideas as being absolute. This 
definition is adopted from Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left 
Wing and Foreign Policy (New Brunswick, New Jersey, I96O), p. 1.
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show what core values became the basis for ideology.^ The 
purpose of this is to isolate the ideas which had a signifi­
cant effect on the ideological direction of the fundamentalist 
and revisionist factions in the Labour party during the 1951- 
1959 period. The present chapter provides an explication of 
the core values of the major influential schools of British 
Socialist thought. Chapter II discusses the conditions sur­
rounding the development of the factions and provides an 
explanation of the basic positions of these groups. The lat­
ter were derived, in the main, from the theories dealt with 
in Chapter I.
It should be noted that the elements embodied in the 
Socialism of the Labour party sprang from many diverse and 
independent sources which are not dealt with here. And while 
all of these, in some respect, had a degree of influence on the 
factions in some cases it was marginal, while in others many 
of the earlier significant strands of thought were filtered, 
refined, and modified by the later groups. It is sufficient, 
therefore, for present purposes to take up the story of 
Socialist development with T.H. Green.
The Pre-War Theorists
It should first be noted that despite the diversity of 
theory, the similarity of core values within the elements in
8 A note of caution should be added concerning the dif­
ferences between theory and ideology. While ideology obviously 
derives from theory and becomes only a crude representation of 
it, a precise line between the two is difficult to draw.
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the party, tempered by British pragmatism, led to a remarkable 
cohesion in policy formation during the inter-war period. This 
should be kept in mind in order to provide a proper perspective, 
as differences among Socialist theorists did not necessarily 
reflect corresponding cleavages among major elements in the 
party. It was only with the Keynsian generation that the means- 
end controversy in British socialism came to the fore in a sig­
nificant way. Aside from the above factors, it was perhaps the 
early fervor of a new creed, the exclusion from office in the 
form of majority government, the fact that not even basic policy 
had been implemented, and the sobering effect of government 
with a majority in the 1945-51 period which postponed the ideo­
logical controversy until the 1950s.
After 1951 the revisionists sought to claim that Socialism 
was primarily a social ethic, but the Labour party's commitment 
to Socialism had been far more than that, as it united a social 
ethic with a definite view of the nature of the existing social 
system and the means which had to be taken to transform it. 
Central to the whole concept was fellowship, which went far 
beyond radicalism and reformism; collectivism had begun to make 
significant advancement in its replacement of individualism. 
Emphasis was put on the welfare and happiness of the community, 
as In the new society the isolation of self would be abolished. 
It would be incorrect to argue that the bulk of the party went 
this far but this was definitely the direction of the re­
orientation of thought. In addition to restating the values 
of the community such an ethica? theory became part of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8principle guiding lines of Socialist economics; the profit
motive was to be replaced by fellowship. It was 'the system'
which was at fault and common ownership was the answer to the
existing ills of society. As a result, 1918 saw the adoption
of the party constitution with its much criticized and lauded
Clause 4.^ There are numerous references available to prove
that this was part of the basic beliefs of all Socialists. In
1909 Ernest Bevin stated;
... you will realize the chaos, misery and degrada­
tion brought upon us by the private ownership of the 
means of life. I claim that Socialism which is the 
common ownership of these means, is the only solu­
tion of such e v i l s . 10
In 1933 Herbert Morrison (later Lord Morrison) wrote;
The function of Labour Governments in the future 
will rather be to secure the socialization of in­
dustry after industry under a management which can 
be broadly relied upon to go on with its work.II
The party wanted drastic change but it was, at the same time,
gradualist and devoted to parliamentary means; further, in
Parliament the large bulk of its policies were reformist and
brought with them the hope of immediate material benefits.
However, throughout the inter-war period in its three major
9 "To secure for the producers by hand and brain the full 
fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution 
thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common own­
ership of the means of production and the best obtainable sys­
tem of popular administration and control of each industry or 
service." Quoted in Henry Felling, A Short History of the 
Labour Party (London, 1965), p. 44.
10 Quoted in Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest 
Bevin (London, I960), p. 21
11 Quoted in S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collecti­
vist Age (New Yo^k, 1965), pT?:0.
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policy statements Labour reiterated its belief in the necessity 
of nationalization for the realization of the Socialist Commonwealth.
T.H. Green's revision of liberal theory resulted in the 
obliteration of the usual lines of demarcation between poli­
tics and economics; economic phenomena had great relevance,
Green argued, as social factors Influencing human behavior and 
they should be considered in their ethical relationship to man 
in society. Green's influence, along with Mill's,brought 
liberalism from its negative view of the state to a positive 
one. The effect of legislation on the welfare of the com­
munity now became the standard of judgement. In a sense, how­
ever, the change was not so drastic when it is viewed as an 
extension of the utilitarian theory of the greatest happiness
1 p
suitably modified by Mill. Green's theory of liberalism had 
a certain affinity to a moderate brand of Socialism and the 
Oxford Idealist and Fabian movements probably represented a 
social reaction against the same inefficiencies in the system.
Although it is difficult to call certain elements in poli­
tical theory Fabian because of the diversity of views held by 
the most prominent members of that group, there can be little 
doubt that utilitarian influences were substantial. Logically 
enough, the utilitarian trend led to a significant emphasis 
being placed on efficiency at the expense of social justice.
Equality was at least as important as fraternity in Fabian
12 For a more detailed account of the influence of T.H. 
Green see George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New 
York, 196 l), pp. 735-4-0.
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thought and. this becomes strikingly apparent when one compares 
the Fabian society with such groups as the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP). Fabianism tended to be far more middle class and 
rationalistic. Liberty played its role in Fabian theory, but 
it was connected with an organic conception of society, having 
heavy Platonic and Hegelian overtones. This organic character 
of Fabian Socialism should not be seen as being similar to 
Fascism. The whole organic concept of society in evolution, 
due in no small part to Darwinian influences, was widely ac­
cepted at the time, and it is only in connection with positive 
recommendations that such thought can be labelled totalitarian 
or democratic. It was, in large part, as a reaction against 
individualistic liberalism that the Fabians stressed social 
unity. But at the same time it was usually maintained that 
liberty was intimately related to leisure. Work, Bernard Shaw 
maintained, was compulsory; and if hours of work could be 
shortened liberty would thereby be increased. This argument 
and its implications regarding the governmental sphere of acti­
vity shows that Fabian socialism was in no sense totalitarian. 
Further, it illustrates a curious ambivalence with regard to 
the idea of freedom. Both freedom as the absence of restraint 
and freedom as autonomy exist side by side throughout British 
socialist thought, forming a curious mixture of collectivism 
and individualism, one predominating in some cases the other in 
others.
The Fabians' dislike of capitalism did not lead them to 
support abrupt or violent measures; rather, it is difficult to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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overemphasize the caution with which they advocated change. 
Sidney Webb argued that change must be democratic, gradual, 
constitutional, and morally acceptable to the masses. How­
ever there could be no doubt that the expropriators of econo­
mic rent were to be abolished as a class by means of taxation 
and that the ownership of major industries was to be taken 
over by the state. Yet, in the bulk of Fabian proposals there 
are few propositions which are not in the mainstream of, or 
a logical result of previous developments in Radical thought.
In 1889 the Fabian Essays in Socialism were p u b l i s h e d .
This volume served to establish the Society as an important 
force and to distinguish it from Marxism and the semi- 
anarchism of the Socialist League, Fabian theory saw Socialism 
as inevitable because of the nature of economic evolution. The 
pressure of the electorate, it was argued in the Essays, would 
speed up this tendency especially as the masses became in­
creasingly aware of their power to mould society. Progress 
already made by means of public awareness and the ballot were 
sufficient to show that this would continue to be the case in 
the future. The transition from feudalism to capitalism had 
been one of long, slow progress just as the present transition 
was and would be. Similarity to Marxism is found in the em­
phasis on economic concentration which, for the Fabians however, 
served to bring closer and make easier the transfer of mono-
13 Sidney Webb, et al., Fabian Essays in Socialism 
(London, I889).
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polies and oligopolies to the public sector not through re­
volution but through a mixture of nationalization, taxation, 
and compensation. Part of the argument was based on social 
justice, the other on utility (in the sense of increased 
efficiency) in an effort to gain the support of the elec­
torate for such a move. Since Socialism was to be attained 
only gradually, compensation seemed normal, but it was to be 
paid out of taxés on economic rent so that the collectivity 
would not have to suffer. Land was to be taken over by local 
public agencies rather than a national one, while in other 
fields these local agencies were to establish enterprises in 
competition with the private sector. It was felt that since 
these government owned enterprises would not be concerned 
with profit, they would be able to undercut capitalist prices; 
and, because they would offer better conditions of work, the 
best labour would drift towards them. The idea that workers 
in the public sector should control their industries was re­
jected; instead, public boards or commissions were to be 
established.!^ The central criticism of capitalist society 
seemed to be not that the rich were rich and the poor were 
poor but rather, that economic control gave vast power to a 
small number of individuals.
The ILP, which came to the fore in the Liberal-Labour
l4 G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought (London, 
1953-58), III, pp. 118-119. Hereafter cited as Socialist 
Thought.
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period, was formed by members of several diverse groups, 
particularly the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the 
Fabians, and elements in the Scottish Labour party. The trade 
unions remained cool despite continued attempts by the party 
to convince them that membership would be to their interest. 
But the ILP began to make advances in the same manner the 
Fabians had, by running candidates in local elections and 
using its position on the councils to advocate concrete and 
immediate reforms in such fields as education and slum clear­
ance. It was this type of policy that gained support for the 
party as it came to be seen as a reform group rather than a 
revolutionary movement. In the short run Radical measures 
were the aim but the ILP never abandoned its Socialist pur­
pose, which it defined at its Bradford Conference of 1893 as 
"the collective ownership of the means of production, distri­
bution and e x c h a n g e . Y e t  the party’s immersion in reform 
led it to make a distinction between such short-run partial 
reforms, and long-run structural reforms which required the 
abolition of capitalism for their, implementation. Thus, while 
the state should attempt to find work for the unemployed, the 
elimination of unemployment was not possible under capitalism, 
and while slums might be cleared the elimination of poverty 
would require the adoption of a collectivist position and the 
abolition of the profit motive.
The stress in this period tended, however, to be ethical
15 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
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rather than economic. The whole movement was utopian in as­
piration, concerned with the betterment of the bottom stratum 
of society. It was a movement almost totally devoid of doc­
trine and, thus, while party theorists listened to the Fabians 
with their explanations concerning the efficiency of national­
ization their major concern was social justice.
This ILP type of Socialism was part of a much wider 
movement, for the most part not Socialist at all, 
of revulsion against the manifest evils of indus­
trial society and, in particular, against the sharp 
contrast between the rapidly growing wealth of 
British society, regarded as a whole, and the appal­
ling squalor and wretchedness of a large section of 
the population in London and other great cities.1°
Guild Socialism which came to prominence/the same period 
as the ILP, was part of a general European trend of thought in 
the pre-World War I era. This pluralism or theory of decen­
tralized authority has been described as "the last significant 
attempt in political theory to deny the importance of the 
state."17 While atomistic individualism once held sway, it 
was rapidly declining, and pluralism was seen to be a compro­
mise between this individualism and pure collectivism. Certain 
ideas in pluralist thought were particularly appealing because 
of their attempt to combine the security of collectivism with 
the fear of state authority. Such a position, however, neg­
lects significant social needs and by itself constitutes a 
rather weak argument in favour of the re-organization of so­
ciety. But when combined with elements characteristic of
16 Ibid.. p. 179.
17 11am, p. 81.
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other types of what was then contemporary, and particularly 
socialist, thought it attains a much greater degree of signi­
ficance, Thus Harold Laski in his early period attempted to 
reconcile group interests and thereby prevent the evils of in­
dividualism appearing in a new form. Laski admitted that al­
legiance to the state was more important than allegiance to 
the group, but argued that alternative loyalties were neces­
sary, If the will of groups and government conflicted, it was 
argued, the victor should be the party whose interests were 
directed towards the common good. The means used to identify 
the body which had the common good in mind was, interestingly 
enough, never revealed.
Guild Socialism aimed at replacing centralized economic 
controls with local ones. It gained the bulk of its impor­
tance after World War I and was primarily the result of intel­
lectual inspiration. Fabians, Christian Socialists, anarchists, 
and Oxford intellectuals were all represented in this group, 
whose central aim seemed to be based on a desire to preserve 
the personality of the individual worker. The model was the 
autonomous medieval guild, which was seen as a system which per­
mitted men to belong to groups and at the same time contribute 
to society. The community was viewed as a spiritual entity,
"a mode of feeling of a number of human beings living together 
under the conditions of social life. Society, on the other hand, 
is a group of centres of deliberation and planning".^® The 
state would become simply a group of economic organizations and
18 Ibid., p. 88
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would be devoid of coercive power, which was seen as the root 
of all disturbances in society. Once the state was abolished, 
the argument ran, the co-operative principle would reassert 
itself and serve as an agent for bringing forth man’s best 
qualities, which capitalism had stifled.
The best and most concise precentation of the thought of
the Guild Socialists is G.D.H. Cole's Guild Socialism Re- 
19stated. Cole begins by outlining certain assumptions: 
democracy ought to prevail in every aspect of life, and de­
mocracy attains reality only when it is dealt with vis-a-vis 
function. In large communities representative government is 
needed, but representation ceases to be democratic when it 
involves the substitution of the will of one for the will of 
many. Parliamentary representation violates the fundamentals 
of democracy in two ways: in the first place, the elector has 
almost no control over his MP, and when the infrequent oc­
casion arises to change him or vote on his conduct the choice 
of candidates is severely limited; secondly, only one man re­
presents the elector on every conceivable range of topics and 
it is highly unlikely that there could be complete agreement 
over the whole sphere of human activity. Essential to demo­
cratic representation, the argument runs, are the requirements 
that the electors have frequent contact with and a large 
measure of control over their representatives, and that re­
presentation should be functional. Human beings cannot be
19 Chicago, 1964.
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represented, only viewpoints. The two central types of 
functional bonds. Cole states, are production and consumption 
orientated; in any industry the sets of controls desired by 
the two groups would be different. For example; the coal 
miners are primarily concerned with the conditions of work and 
the like, while consumers are primarily concerned with quality 
and quantity of the product. Guild Socialism maintains that 
internal management and control, as a trust given by the com­
munity, should belong to the workers, although safeguards 
should be added for the consumer. This would give workers a 
psychological feeling of freedom and self-government. Indirect 
control through parliamentary representatives conveys no such 
feeling.
Guild Socialism, however, was a passing phenomenon, and 
went into an early decline but not without having influenced 
trade union and Socialist ideas. Post-war demands for workers' 
control put forward by the trade unions, can in some measure 
be attributed to the influence of the Guild Socialists. The 
Sankey Commission on the coal mines, which reported in 1919, 
argued for nationalization and, in addition, stated "it is in 
the interests of the country that the colliery worker shall in 
the future have an effective voice in the direction of the 
mines,
20 Quoted in Socialist Thought, IV, pp. 4l7-4l8.
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Socialist Theory in the Inter-War Years
The themes of equality and fellowship were paramount 
with Green and the other Oxford idealists and were further 
developed in the inter-war years by A.D. Lindsay. The 
philosophical basis of Lindsay's socialism was clearly shown 
in his 1928 debate with Laski. Lindsay's thought is pri­
marily philosophical and moral; he goes back to Rousseau's 
General Will, disregarding any organic interpretation and 
viewing the moral will as general, arguing that man is moti­
vated by both selfish and altruistic instincts. Man wants 
to be freed from his selfishness by participation in the com­
munity, and, further, pluralism is a device which could be 
used as an intermediary to bring the citizen into his full 
relationship with the state. Laski countered by arguing that 
the state is only a collection of individuals, and in itself 
it is without any moral or ethical importance. The will of 
the state, then, is simply the will of those individuals who 
have been able to gain enough power to control it. It is a 
purely utilitarian device. Lindsay replied, arguing that the 
state could undertake the performance of wide ranging reforms 
while at the same time preserving its democratic nature only 
if it could be proven that the state is no more than the in­
strument of select interests. The state can fulfill its 
proper role only once the altruistic instincts of its citizens 
are realized.
Lindsay concerned himself with democracy in a manner more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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than faintly reminiscent of John Stuart Mill. He deprecated 
forms and emphasized the necessity of spiritual reality. To 
bring this into being, the social and economic basis of the 
state must be changed to bring about equality, as it is im­
possible to have real political democracy without social and 
economic democracy. Although leadership is necessary in any 
state, there should be continuous participation by the masses 
and, in order to attain this, men must be made politically 
aware.
It is by living together that men learn what they 
want and conceive purposes to which they will de­
vote themselves, by playing complementary parts in 
a society of which they are all members.21
Once all inequalities in the system are seen to come from
functional distinctions democracy will work. Socialism in
Lindsay is divorced from material considerations and dialec-
pp
tical inevitability; it becomes instead a moral necessity.^
The grand theorists of English Socialism owe little to 
Marx, and it now becomes necessary to offer some reason for 
this. England was the only European society which by the end 
of the nineteenth century had a preponderance of industry 
over agriculture and which had correspondingly progressive 
political and social institutions. Although this was the 
first country in which revolution should logically have taken
21 A.D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State. (London, 
1959), p. 260.
22 A critique of Lindsay's position is given in Ulam,
pp. 96-120.
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place, Marxism was unable to attract any significant sector 
of the population, as its appeal rests on a feeling of 
grievance and alienation which was not, relatively speaking, 
widespread in the England of the 1890s. Concern for the 
class war could not thrive on a franchise that was as broad 
as that which existed in Britain. Further, the strength of 
the trade unions within the existing social structure saw to 
it that there was not as great a misunderstanding of the facts 
of industrial life as there was in other countries and that 
there was some involvement by workers in the politics of the 
day, which facilitated concern with piecemeal reform rather 
than revolutionary action. Trade union biases mirrored the 
attitude of the workers; the separateness but not the alien­
ation that accompanied it in other countries. They accepted 
the industrial system but not capitalism.^3
Marxism had to wait until the 1930s, with the depression 
and the rise of Fascism, before it made any significant head­
way into the British Socialist movement. But it then became 
a predominant influence in the thought of many socialists, in 
large measure intellectuals such as Laski and John Strachey 
and persons in the party leadership such as Aneurin Bevan and
Sir Stafford Cripps. Indeed, even the Webbs and G.D.H. Cole
2h
were strongly influenced by Marx in this period.
23 Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the 
Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York, I960), 
p. 1^3
2k See G.D.H. Cole, What Marx Really Meant (London, 193^)*
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A very few socialist thinkers stood outside the 
Marxist stream, and a number of non-analytical 
works of a practical reformist nature were still 
being written. But Marxism was the dominant in­
tellectual influence, and it made a profound im­
pact on my generation of socialists in their 
formative years ... It is easy to forget today, 
not merely how unanimous socialist writers were 
in anticipating the collapse of capitalism, but 
how completely their analytical systems, their 
.prophecies, and their recommendations, all 
hinged on this belief.25
Of the major Socialist works produced in this period John
Strachey's writings were most significant in the economic
sphere, while Harold Laski's works were perhaps most signi-
26fleant in the political sphere.
Laski rejects pluralism, state sovereignty being a neces­
sity if the state is to fulfill its function of ensuring a 
certain system of class relations. Laski defines the state 
as simply "the executive instrument of the class in society 
which owns the means of p r o d u c t i o n . I n  order to limit the 
power of the state, as the pluralist wants to do, the class 
structure of society must first be destroyed. Every.society 
before the advent of a socialist utopia, must sustain some
25 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, 196k-), 
pp. 2-k.
26 John Strachey, The Coming: Strueele for Power (London, 
193k-), and The Nature of Capitalist Crisis (London, 1936), 
and for Laski see particularly The State in Theory and Prac­
tice (New York, 1935), The Rise of European Liberalism (London, 
1936), Democracy in Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1933), and Liberty in 
the Modern State (New York, 1930).
27 Quoted in Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of 
Harold J. Laski (New York, 195*+), p. 15^«
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system of relationships between classes and the means of 
production, and the sovereign state serves as a coercive in­
strument to attain that end. All struggles within the state 
are struggles of economic classes trying to obtain the sov­
ereign power. The emergence of Fascism, Laski argues, proves 
the validity of the Marxist theory of the state. The unity 
of capitalism and political democracy is a phenomenon of the 
expansionist stage of capitalism, but when contraction sets 
in the contradictions become apparent, and in order for de­
mocracy to survive, capitalism must be replaced by socialism. 
But Fascism appears to save the former. While benefits may 
be grudgingly granted to workers in the expansionist stage 
of capitalism, these must be severely limited or entirely 
curtailed in the contractory phase as they become a threat to 
profits. The masses obey the forces of capitalism because 
during its period of expansion it is able to offer them cer­
tain benefits; as a result, many become semi-bourgeois. As 
long as capitalism results in a betterment of the worker's 
position he will accept its authority but when it can no 
longer fulfill,these expectations the danger of revolution 
arises.
Laski believed that political power derives from economic 
power; and the former, in itself, is totally unable to deal 
With the latter. It is, therefore, a waste of time to at­
tempt to limit economic power by legal and political means.
The Socialist state should possess all the power it needs to 
reshape society, and this duty must not be hampered by
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limitations on government, Guild Socialist schemes are, 
therefore, of no real value. In its simplest form this view­
point maintains that, if a parliamentary minority refuses to
accept the decision of the parliamentary majority there is
29no possibility of a peaceful transformation.
If Fascism comes to Britain in the contractory phase
there will be revolutions from below and if this brings a
socialist government, Laski argues, freedom would have to be
sharply curtailed to deal with transitional problems. Even
if its policy met with peaceful acceptance, the 
continuance of parliamentary government would de­
pend upon its possession of guarantees from the 
Conservative Party that its work of transforma­
tion would not be disrupted by repeal in the 
event of a defeat at the polls.30
Further, if policy were to be opposed by business interests 
constitutional government would have to be suspended; and, 
although Laski feared physical violence, he maintained that 
the blame would not be on the majority but rather the minority. 
Liberty may temporarily have to be suppressed in order to at­
tain the greater freedom of the age of socialism. It might 
happen that the ruling class would meet a socialist parlia-
28 A table concerning party attitudes towards cultural 
norms and symbols in Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston, 
196k), p. 56, shows that while the Conservative and Liberal 
parties strongly support limits on government the Labour party 
is subject to sharp intra-party divisions ranging from partial 
support to complete rejection.
29 Deane, p. I71.
30. Laski, Democracy in Crisis, p. 87.
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mentary victory by instituting a class dictatorship neces­
sitating revolution. However, Laski cautioned. Socialists 
should continue to use constitutional means until the capi­
talists tried to smash their m o v e m e n t .31
Last among the varied influences on English Socialist 
thought are the writings of two prominent Liberals: J.M.
Keynes (later Lord Keynes) and Sir William Beveridge (later 
Lord Beveridge), It was the depression which provided the 
chief spur to their thought as it had doubtless done for 
Laski.
The idea of freedom as a positive rather than negative 
quantity lead to the evolution of a new type of political 
economy. The ills of such a highly developed industrial so­
ciety as Britain's were the result, Keynes felt, of a mal­
distribution of income and a resulting propensity to oversave, 
The economic postulates of this new thought bore a close re­
semblance to certain Socialist ideas. Indeed, there was 
nothing opposed to Socialism and much that was congenial to 
it in its encouragement of high levels of mass consumption 
and its advocacy of a significant redistribution of income by 
the use of fiscal p o l i c y . 32 But such a policy not only
31 Sir Stafford Cripps, later Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
took a similar view when he stated: "If the Socialists come to 
the conclusion that there was any real danger of such a step 
being taken, it would probably be better and more conducive to 
the general peace and welfare of the country for the Socialist 
government to make itself temporarily into a dictatorship until 
the matter could again be put to test at the polls." Quoted in 
Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism, p. 73*
32 Ibid., p. 136
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results in increased interference by government in the af­
fairs of society but forces the criterion of short-run 
economic policy to be one thing: an increase or at least the 
maintenance of the current level of the standard of living.
The primary goal becomes security and comfort for the col­
lectivity, an undesirable goal to the fundamentalist when it 
becomes an end not a means. The fundamentalist advocates the 
abolition of capitalism not primarily because it is an inef­
ficient method of production or even because of its effect on 
the distribution of goods, but because it is seen as involving 
an unjust and immoral system of private property and social 
differentiation. The ethical ideas of equality and fellowship 
were inseparably connected with the abolition of capitalism by 
means of nationalization. Some might think it questionable, 
therefore, as to how far Keynsian thought is compatible with 
the long-run alms of Socialism. When this type of thought is 
coupled with the short-run interests of a Labour government 
there is a danger that the long-run aims will be forgotten.
The immediate possibility of curing the worst aspects of the 
existing society and changing important priorities in its 
operation may well have had preponderant influence over long- 
run aspirations which have as yet not proven their 
effectiveness.33
One of Beveridge's central goals was the attainment of
33 For a critique of reform theory from the Fabians to 
Beveridge see Ibid.. pp. 121-161.
177833
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full employment which required that certain powers be in the 
hands of government to enable it to modify and adjust the 
operation of the market,^ In order to maintain relatively 
full employment total outlay had to be subject to some meas­
ure of government control and the mobility of the labour 
force had to be significantly increased. Continuing high 
taxes, national insurance schemes, a national health service, 
a national nutrition policy, and adult education were other 
significant recommendations. There can be little doubt that 
the implications of the Beveridge Report are socialist, al­
though in its moderate sense. It provided a general analysis 
of economic and social policy under capitalism, and its re­
commendations call for severe modifications in the system 
which, when backed by certain ethical premises could be call­
ed socialist.
The list of essential liberties given above does 
not include liberty of a private citizen to own 
means of production and to employ other citizens 
in operating them at wage. Whether private owner­
ship of means of production to be operated by 
others is a good economic device or not, it must 
be judged as a device. It is not an essential 
liberty in Britain, because it is not and never 
has been enjoyed by more than a very small pro­
portion of the British people.35
The thought of the major party factions in the 1950s was 
heavily coloured by the political theory of the pre-war English 
socialists. And although, strong Guild Socialist and Neo-
3k- The main proposals were embodied in The Report on 
Social Insurance and Allied Services (New York, 19*+2).
35 Sir William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free So­
ciety (New York, 19k-5)j p. 23.
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Idealist elements can be found on the left and strong Fabian 
elements on the right, the two most immediate and primary 
influences were the Marxism of thinkers like Laski and 
Strachey on the one hand, and the Welfare State ideology of 
Beveridge and Keynes on the other.
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CHAPTER II
THE LABOUR PARTY: FUNDAMENTALISM AND REVISIONISM
Labour in the post-war government carried out many of 
the Beveridge proposals, but it was not long before sharp 
divisions arose regarding the party's purpose and policies, 
and Bevan's resignation as Minister of Health served simply 
to dramatize this deep conflict over the fundamental aims of 
the party. The party, of course, had always been pluralis­
tic and had long had various tendencies but the debate in 
previous years had taken place within a certain ideological 
consensus. The critical period in the transformation of the 
party ran from 19k-? to 1950, Post-war plans were made and 
reconstruction begun with faith in the old Socialism, but 
the experience of office caused a swing in party attitudes. 
The most significant and vital change in policy was the 
trend away from the idea of the Socialist Commonwealth and 
the acceptance of the Welfare State and planned economy as 
the basis for government action, Attlee's government was 
forced to make a decision between the continued use of the 
market as a basis for economic policy and its abolition. In 
its decision, the government was heavily influenced by Keynes 
and Beveridge and by the system of quantitative planning 
using physical controls which had been a central method of 
resource allocation during the war,
28
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The Post-War Transformation 
In the initial post-war years the Labour government con­
tinued to emphasize physical planning and give financial 
policy a second place. However, it should be noted, the use 
of physical planning was not totally the result of socialist 
ideology but would have, in any event, played a significant 
role whatever party had held power. In dealing with post­
war inflationary pressure the government tried to hold prices 
down by using direct controls. But the 19*+7-1950 period saw 
sharp changes with the greatly increased use of financial 
policy in the form of deflationary analysis accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease in the use of physical controls, 
particularly in the area of labour mobility. The significant 
factor here was the realization that it was not a labour 
shortage that was the cause of Britian's economic ills but 
rather suppressed inflation and that this prevented the flow 
of labour to.certain industries. This labour immobility led 
to a seeming misallocation of resources. What was needed, 
according to Keynsian analysis, was a surplus budget and 
greater use of the market. Pressure had been for some time 
put on the government by various economists, economic jour­
nalists, and MPs but the government did not retreat full 
force from physical planning concepts. In fact, in 19*+7 it 
enlarged the planning sphere because certain factions in the 
party, particularly the Keep Left group of MPs (most notably 
R.H.S, Crossman, Michael Foot, and Ian Mikardo), which ad­
vocated nationalization of every industry which had any degree
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of control over the economy as well as the extensive use of 
physical planning, were strongly critical of deflationary 
p o l i c y , 36 By 1950, however, the physical planning principle 
had been abandoned, and Cripps in his budget of that year 
called for the full use of financial policy citing it as the 
most important means of government control over the economy. 
This approach could not help but bring into doubt the value 
of large scale nationalization and even the traditional 
socialist conception of fellowship, for such policies re­
quired the maintenance of a modified form of capitalism and, 
indeed, had to rely, in large part, for their effectiveness 
on self-interest and the profit motive.
Quite aside from any value financial controls might have 
over physical planning in a pure economic sense, the abandon­
ment of controls was particularly influenced by the unfavor­
able attitude of the trade unions towards a high degree of 
government direction over the organization and movement of 
labour. As the problem of inflation became more acute critics 
began to call for some type of wage policy, but as such a 
policy would have interfered with collective bargaining the 
unions opposed it. In the early months of 1948 a compromise 
solution was reached. As a result, the policy of wage re­
restraint was to remain effective for three years; union
36 See particularly Thomas Balogh, "Britain's Economic 
Problems," Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXIII, no, 1
(Feb., 1949), 32-67.
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agreement, however, being tentative upon the government’s 
ability to keep prices and profits down at the same time. The 
pound was devalued in 19*+9 resulting in price increases in 
1950 and, as a result, the General Council of the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) passed a resolution opposing wage restraint. 
The government tried to reach some agreement with the unions 
but to no avail.
This served to show exactly what the unions would and 
would not do; they refused to accept government control over 
manpower and showed their determination to maintain their 
traditional functional role and position. In effect, they 
refused to accept the Socialist Commonwealth. A greater num­
ber of changes had occurred since the inter-war years. The 
material welfare of the workers had improved immensely, es­
pecially in relation to other classes, and the power of the 
unions had undergone a drastic increase through Labour's 
membership in the coalition government and its increased con­
tacts with ministers and civil s e r v a n t s .37 The unions were 
no longer primarily dependent on a particular party being in 
power, and this increased the feeling of participation in 
major policy decisions and led to a greater sense of accept­
ance, a more pragmatic attitude, and, a greater willingness
37 C.A.R, Crosland, "The Future of the Left," Encounter. 
XIV, no. 3 (March, I96O), 3-12.
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- 38to compromise,J
The experience and responsibility of office alone would 
have caused a realignment of policy. Inflationary diffi­
culties, coupled with the balance of payments crisis neces­
sitated a reorientation in Socialist thought, and this led
to the necessary conclusion that it was production, not dis­
tribution, that was the central problem in the economic sys­
tem. Nationalization had hitherto been the most important 
single item in party policy.
As, a program it was justified in diverse and often 
contradictory ways but while it remained merely a
program, it served admirably to unite different
interests within the p a r t y , 39
The policy of nationalization was put in the hands of a group 
of ministers led by Herbert Morrison who saw it as being pri­
marily a means of increasing economic efficiency. Other 
groups within the party objected sharply when they saw that 
nationalized industries, run on the lines of strict pursuit of 
commercial practice, were difficult to hold accountable to 
Parliament and failed to allow for workers' participation.
The 1951 election defeat prompted, on the part of numer­
ous Labourites, an analysis of the causes of the disaster.
38 The bulk of this analysis is based on S,H, Beer, pp. 
188-216, For a more detailed analysis of financial and eco­
nomic policy see his Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of 
Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain (Oxford, 1957).
39 Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Transformation of the British 
Labour Party Since 1945," Journal of Politics. XXI, no, 3 
(May, 1959), 244.
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A major reason for the defeat was seen to be the inability
of Labour candidates to pick up a significant number of
Liberal votes where for the first time there was no Liberal 
1+0
candidate. Several studies showed that the party's sup­
port was heterogeneous and not divided on strict class 
l i n e s . T h e  party, or rather certain sections of it, were 
increasingly tempted to aim their appeal at the marginal 
voter in the centre of the political spectrum, rather than at 
their most ardent supporters who were, they felt, sure to 
support it in any case because of the lack of any realistic 
alternative. The revisionists then, accepted what they saw 
as. the need for change and were ready to change doctrine to 
accommodate it, but a significant segment of the party op­
posed this.
The revisionist view that the Labour party must grope 
for the middle ground in order to obtain the margin of vic­
tory seems to have been empirically validated. Further, elec­
tions are decided by the overall change in voting behavior and 
from 1945 to 1959 the total movement towards the Conservatives 
was 7.3 percent while between 1950 and 1959 it was only 4 per­
cent. Thus a relatively small change in attitude during the 
latter period could have wiped out the Conservative majority
40 H.G, Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950 
(London, I95I), pp. 296, 320-21.
41 Most notably see Mark Penney, A.P. Gray, and R.H. 
Pear, How People Vote (London, 1956), pp. 175-189.
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and brought back a Labour government. Table 1 on the next 
page explains this. From the evidence provided it seems fair 
to deduce that about 85 percent of the voters were or ap­
peared to be absolutely stable in their attitudes. However, 
certain qualifications must be added. Not all those who vote 
at any one election vote at the next; there is an influx of 
new voters and a decrease in the number of old voters, as 
about one half million die each year. In this way one sixth 
of the electorate is replaced every ten years. Further, if 
abstainers can be induced to support a given party this can 
provide the margin of victory. If a third party candidate 
enters the race this can effect the margin of votes decisive­
ly. Lastly, the swing vote is only overall; there is always 
a minority that vote against the trend. Thus, it is esti­
mated that about one quarter of the electorate can, in fact, 
be classified as floating.
The revisionist theory of long-term shifts in the elec­
torate's attitudes is particularly significant, although it 
must be seen as part of a general tendency and caution must 
be exercised so that the argument is not overstated. General­
ly, affluence detracts from Labour support to the benefit of 
the Conservatives, and although this is the pattern as it de­
veloped in the 1950s it could be reversed in the future. 
Despite this, since the opinion of Labour and Conservative
k-2 Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders ; The Social 
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 1963), P . 69.
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Table- I
Voting in Post-War General Elections: 19^5-59
Year Electors Voters Conservatives Labour Liberal Other
(thousands)
1 9 4 5 3 2 , 8 3 6 24,083 9 , 5 7 8 11,633 2,197 675
1 9 5 0 3 4 , 2 7 0 2 8 , 7 7 3 1 2 , 5 0 3 1 3 , 2 6 7 2 , 6 2 2 3 8 1
1 9 5 1 34,646 2 8 , 5 9 6 1 3 , 7 1 8 1 3 , 9 ^ 9 7 3 1 1 9 8
1 9 5 5 34,858 2 6 , 7 6 0 1 3 , 2 8 7 12,405 7 2 2 346
1 9 5 9 35,297 27,859 1 3 , 7 5 0 12,216 1,639 2 5 5
Source; Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders : The Social 
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 69
electors were not radically different, it was an exception to 
see a voter support his party consistently on all issues. 
Gallup polls indicate "that the majority and the minority on 
each issue cut across party lines as much as they follow 
t h e m . "^3 Thus, while Labour electors were more leftist than 
Conservative, both groups were very close to the national 
average. Partisanship was usually about 30 percent with a 
maximum of 45 percent and there was therefore always a sub­
stantial minority of Labour (or Conservative) electors sup­
porting the opposite view. Figure I on the following page 
indicates the degree of cohesion of the attitudes of electors
43 . Ibid.. p .  75
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Figure I
Proportion of Electors of the Two Main Parties Favoring a 
Rightwing Answer on Individual Issues
Economic and .social 
issues A
Humanit- Foreign affairs 
arianRight
Conservât!
20^
Left
1 2 3 ^ 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1^ 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22
Source: Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders : The Social
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 196'), p. 78.
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towards policy issues.
The electoral supporters of both parties seldom agree 
with all major policy lines, but select issues in themselves 
do not seem to form the basis of party loyalty. Electors 
tend to choose not between programmes but rather between im­
ages such as the Welfare State and free enterprise. Images 
are generally influenced by issues over time, by party lead­
ership and by party dynamism. It was the pre-war image of 
Labour that the post-war revisionists sought to change. While 
in 19*+9 twenty-seven percent of the public favored further
+^4 The numbers running along the horizontal line repre­
sent specific policy issues as follows:
1 Humanitarianism: capital punishment
2 : corporal punishment
3 Liberal ; reform of licensing laws
h ; reform of the House of Lords to enable peers
to stand for the Commons 
5 Foreign Affairs: nuclear disarmament
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13 Economic and 
Social Issues
Ik
15
16
19
20
21
22
testing of nuclear weapons by the West
setting of nuclear bases in Britain
recognition of East Germany
opinion of Spain
opinion on South Africa
opinion on the U.N.
entry into the Common Market
taxes: satisfaction with the level of taxation 
: choice between taxes and social services 
: raising the level or surtax 
: abolition of Schedule A tax 
: introduction of a capital gains tax 
increase in National Health Service charges 
further nationalization measures 
industrial relations : resist wage claims
: sympathy with workers 
on strike 
: responsibility for cost- 
of-living increase with 
government or trade 
unions
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1+5
nationalization, by I960 this had declined to eleven percent. 
Such statistics clearly bothered segments of the party who 
were determined to modernize it and make it more responsive 
to the electorate, upon whom its ultimate survival depended. 
Such a change, they felt, would be comparable to changes made 
by the Conservative party, which had at first opposed many 
Labour policies and then moved further towards the centre by 
accepting them. This flexibility in attitude, in the Con­
servative party, which results from the party's overriding 
concern with gaining office, was one of the primary reasons 
the Conservatives formed the government during the entire 
1951-1959 period, Crosland's comment sums up the revisionist 
position: "If British Socialism succeeds in adapting itself
and its doctrines to the mid-twentieth century, it might even
1+6get back into power, and have a chance to implement them."
Two factors then, the change in economic planning and the 
change in the electorate's attitudes, were the chief influences 
on the development of the revisionist and fundamentalist fac­
tions that were the protagonists in the struggle of the 1950s.
Revisionism
The argument of the revisionists during the 1950s was that 
the ethical aspects of Socialism were of the essence. It was
45 S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age 
(New York, 1965), p. 21? .
46 C.A.R. Crosland, p. 12,
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held that the significant factors were equality of opportu­
nity and, trailing at a respectful distance, fellowship, and 
that while these ends were all important the means of attain­
ment were constantly in flux and the party had to adopt it­
self to the age it was living in. Thus, complete support of 
certain ethical ends was to be combined with an extremely 
flexible concept of means. The revisionists wrote that early 
socialism with its desire to do away with capitalism had con­
tinually lost support as the basic economy theory on which
the principles stood had been undermined. What was left,
47they felt, was simply a remnant from the past. ‘ The dif­
ficulty was that the early Socialist belief in the social 
ethic was inseparably connected with a certain view of the 
operation of the social and economic forces in society. Indeed, 
it is questionable if the social ethic and the theory of social 
forces can be separated. Revisionist theory left an important 
private sphere in which self-interest was the motivating force 
and while, under such a system equality and a limited amount 
of fellowship might be attained, it is highly questionable 
whether a complete transition to the Socialist Commonwealth 
can ever be made. It could be argued that the social ethic had 
itself been changed, that man could never be a purely selfless 
being and that therefore, one must adjust one's views to the 
essential nature of man. In essence, this was the most signi-
47 Socialist Union, Twentieth Century Socialism (Harmonds­
worth, 1956), p. 12.
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ficant and underlying change that revisionism necessitated,
C.A.R. Crosland’s The Future of Socialism is a pithy and 
succinct statement of revisionism as outlined by its leading 
theorist .Cr osl and  maintains that the most characteristic 
and offensive aspects of nineteenth century capitalism have 
either been completely eliminated or have become so modified 
as to be almost unrecognizable and that, as a result, a 
nineteenth-century analysis of the system has little rele­
vance for the 1950s. Further, certain aspects of the system, 
such as the separation of the workers from the means of pro­
duction which had previously been connected with and ascribed 
to private ownership had been found to stem from the intri­
cacies of large scale organization. Crosland enlarged on 
this maintaining that conditions were slowly changing and 
increasingly separating ownership and control, and arguing 
that it was function that determined class,not ownership.
The variety of sources of Socialist doctrine, Crosland 
maintains, make it impossible to find a central orthodox view 
to serve as a guide to future action. The differences be­
tween Socialist theories are numerous and with many of them 
it is not a case of priorities; they are just mutually incom­
patible. With this, the argument runs, all that can be done 
is to make an attempt to Isolate certain themes that have had 
a predominant influence, which have occurred in several of 
varied schools, and which are of relevance to contemporary
48 (London, 1964).
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society. Further, a sharp distinction has to be made between 
ends and means. Ethical goals then become the only signifi­
cant link between all Socialsts. These are: a desire to al­
leviate the conditions of the workers under capitalism, 
social welfare, equality, fellowship and opposition to cer-
49
tain defects in the system, most significantly unemployment. 
The first and last of these, Crosland maintains, are becoming 
unimportant as capitalism is transformed, and this leaves 
fellowship, equality, and social welfare as the chief ethical 
goals of society.
It proves difficult to create, Crosland argues, any 
permanent feelings of fellowship in a full sense. The goal 
of co-operation has, of course, been partially reached as 
any comparison with the situation of a century ago well il­
lustrates. The competitive instinct has suffered severe blows 
yet full co-operation has by no means been achieved. Although 
self-interest remains a vital factor in individual decision 
making and its importance might be further diminished, there 
is no means of telling if this would be the case and no prac­
tical plan exists which might be followed in order to make it 
so, without the strong risk of serious detrimental effects 
being felt in the search for the attainment of other desir­
able ends such as the standard of living, privacy, and equal-
49 Crosland mentions that he has included only economic 
and social values and has deleted political ones as concern 
for the latter permeates the whole of the political culture. 
Ibid.. p. 68.
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ity, Crosland continues:
While, therefore, I realize that as a matter of 
verbal precision the co-operative ideal is cer­
tainly embraced by the word 'socialism', and 
while I accept that it would clearly be in some 
sense 'better' if there were a more general 
awareness of a common social purpose. I do not 
feel able, in what is intended to be a reason­
ably definite and practical statement of social­
ist aims, to include this as part of the goal.50
Thus, the central theme of inter-war Socialism is relegated 
to the background.
Social welfare and equality remain, but neither of them 
is primarily economic in nature; although the greatest abuses 
have formerly been in the economic sphere. But these have 
been largely remedied. With the present rate of growth, 
Crosland states, the economic sphere will require even less 
attention and socialism will be able to turn to the social 
and psychological causes of distress. Economic factors are 
no longer considered the sole determinants of class; educa­
tion, style of life and occupational status have now become 
matters of primary concern. In the pre-1939 period there was 
a definite need for the levelling of income; but in the 1950s 
any further redistribution would have been ineffective in the 
sense of having a significant bearing on the standard of 
living of the masses. The bitterness present in Britain is 
sociological not economic in origin; in a period where all 
are relatively well off social discrimination is rampant. 
Industrial disputes then become not so much matters of wages
50 Ibid.. p. 76.
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and conditions of work but of prestige and power.
There is a strong ethical basis in the quest for greater 
equality in that it would lead to the realization of a greater 
degree of social justice, decrease resentment, and increase 
contentment. The existing inequalities which offend against 
social justice are the educational system, the small segment 
of citizens in the upper stratum of society who monopolize in­
herited wealth, the power of the bureaucrat in industry, nepo­
tism, and.class favoritism. Crosland argues that means should 
be taken to limit the power of elites and to establish a more 
cohesive and harmonious society through the elimination of 
class differences with their great reinforcing effect on so­
cial stratification. Crosland concludes;
... as we approach the socialist goals described 
above, the reformer will bend his energies more 
and more to issues which cannot be classified as 
specifically socialist or non-socialist, but which 
lie in other fields altogether ... the freedom of 
personal and leisure life and social responsibili­
ty for cultural values.51
Fundamentalism 
A significant group of Socialists were not willing to 
accept this change which meant the de facto abandonment of 
nationalization and the relegation of fellowship to a sub­
sidiary place vis-a-vis equality. There was considerable sup­
port for the editors of the semi-official organ of the Left,
51 Ibid., p. 353
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Tribune, when in its July 11, 1952 issue it rejected inno­
vations in theory because it
consists not in producing new ideas or fresh ap­
proaches, but in watering down distinctive 
socialist ideas ,.. The dynamic socialism of in­
dustrial society made fifty or one hundred years 
ago ... is infinitely more modern and more rele­
vant to the problems of our d a y . 52
The Left's attitude toward the Keynsian revolution was best 
summed up by R.H.S. Crossman; "Keynsianism may have undermined 
the old fashioned economic case for Socialism but it has left 
the political and moral case for it completely unaffected.
This does not mean the fundamentalists were united on all 
things; although their position as a minority group in the 
party tended to increase cohesion. Even though fundamental­
ist policies were, to a large extent, similar in the inter-war 
years diversity in detail was great. But there tended to be
basis agreement on two of the most significant aspects of
Socialism; nationalization and fellowship.
Defining the Labour Left is difficult, if not impossible, 
as relatively few of those who styled themselves as leftists 
were thoroughgoing Marxists. But many had definite Marxist 
leanings mixed with a type of socialist humanism. Aside from 
the few hard core Marxists those who styled themselves as
leftists tended to rely increasingly on the writings of a few
prominent American intellectuals, most notably C. Wright Mills
52 Quoted in Gerhard Loewenberg, p. 238.
53 R.H.S. Crossman, Socialism and the New Despotism 
(London, 1956), p. 5.
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and J.K. Galbraith. Even within the PLP it would have been 
almost an impossibility to find a definitely structured and 
coherent system except among the hard core of some fifty 
members who were consistently on the Left, A substantial 
number of core leftists were and are journalists, intellec­
tuals, and teachers. The journalists tended to be seen as 
the leading element both within and without the PLP and the 
list of such members is long.^^ The Left gained a substan­
tial margin of its strength from its influence through the 
mass media; this provided a continuous flow of information 
to the faithful and a strong element of continuity.
The Marxist flavor of the Left was very noticeable.
The Left uses a number of stereotypes or concepts 
of Marxist provenance; a stereotype of capitalism, 
the concept of 'economic power', the conception of 
class as an economic category; and with these goes 
the notion of class-war and the belief that funda­
mentally all social relationships are determined 
by economic forces. In some instances, these no­
tions are articulated together and held quite 
cosciously in a kind of Marxist system. In most 
cases, however, they are floating notions, hardly 
' held together by any systematic philosophy -
vestiges and residues of Marxism, often held un­
consciously as presuppositions or assumptions.
From this vantage point came a distrust and suspicion of
American motives and actions and a sympathy for the Soviet
Union. The distrust of America stemmed from its being the
5“+ Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign 
Policy (New Brunswick, New Jersey, I96O), pp. 27-31.
55 S.E. Finer, H.B. Berrington and D.J. Bartholomew, 
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons : 1955-1959 (London, 
1961), p. 52. For a particularly good example see R.H.S. 
Grossman, "The Spectre of Revisionism," Encounter, XIV, no. h 
(April, I960), 24-28.
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last stronghold of 'pure' capitalism, its materialism, and 
its hegemony over the British economy and over Britain as a 
political entity in the world power struggle. Feeling toward 
the Soviet Union was sympathetic. Many were initially con­
fident that Britain was well suited to establish good rela­
tions with Russia and while this attitude fell by the wayside 
in the centre and on the right in the early post-war years it 
continued to be cardinal to the left. Laski went to great 
lengths to argue that Russia's main aim was security, and 
that once this had been attained brutality and policies like 
those in Eastern Europe would quickly d i s a p p e a r . T h e r e  is 
certainly a grain of truth in this; but more moderate was 
Sevan's attitude.
The dominating position of the U.S. would have been 
much easier to accept if there had been a clear 
idea of what she wanted to do with it. Of that 
there was no clue, except, of course, that she was 
against communism. It was also obvious from many 
of the speeches of her principle spokesmen that she 
was almost as strongly opposed to British Socialism.
In addition, the Left tended to be pacifistic. But this has
had a long tradition in British politics, particularly during
the inter-war years and significantly, most strongly in the
Labour party. ■It should be kept in mind that although the
Left placed much emphasis on foreign policy that Socialist
views in that area tend to be applications of theories already
developed in the domestic sphere.
56 See Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold 
J. Laski (New York, 1954), pp. 320-324 for a discussion of 
Laski's views on the Soviet Union.
57 Aneuran Bevan, In Place of Fear (London, 1952), pp. 
125-126.
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Anti-colonialism and views toward foreign aid were 
particularly significant in this light. The Left maintained 
that armaments alone were not enough to keep the peace. In­
stead of peace being primarily dependent on arms, it was 
felt that poverty was one of the primary causes of interna­
tional tensions. The preservation of peace, then, was seen 
as being a political, economic, and social matter. Foreign 
aid, as well as being a necessity if world peace were to be 
maintained, was seen as being a direct application of the 
socialist goal of fellowship. The Left argued, in a parti­
cularly strong manner, that the money being spent on British 
armaments should have been spent on the much more immediate 
and stronger need of aid to underdeveloped countries.
Socialism and the New Despotism, by R.H.S. Crossman, 
presents a theory of social organization which is a represen­
tative statement of views concerning domestic affairs that 
found wide acceptance on the left. Crossman argues that 
Labour has been losing support because of its association with 
war-time and post-war controls, bureaucratic control of so­
cialized industry, the feeling that the Socialist revolution 
was not in fact increasing freedom but rather moving towards 
a managerial society, and the equation, in some circles, of 
British and Soviet Socialism.
Before 1945 the major problem was seen as mass unemploy­
ment but the Keynsian revolution gave an effective solution 
to this. Keynes stated. Crossman goes on, that his solution 
would resolve the contradiction- of capitalism; in line
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with this it can be seen that the least dogmatic parts of the 
1945-50 Labour government's programme were the most success­
ful. The Welfare State was an unmitigated success but nation­
alization did not go all the way expected in improving the 
conditions of the workers in the industries concerned.
Britain, Grossman feels, is getting the worst of both worlds
(East and West) because oligopoly not monopoly or perfect
58competition prevails. This oligopoly, he maintains, is 
protected by a monolithic bureaucracy which stifles compe­
tition and, as a result, does not create the desired equili­
brium which is present in the United States. Thus, while it 
might seem that there are only two choices open, it would be 
incorrect to base Socialism, which is essentially a moral pro­
test against injustice, on any specific economic theory. So­
cial and political aspects attain, therefore, great importance 
in economic organization.
Tawney proved, Grossman maintains, that political demo­
cracy and political freedom are attainable only when they are 
combined with social control of the economy; public control 
may be no easier to work with but without it freedom is impos­
sible.^9 Tawney's analysis became steadily more relevant
58 It is difficult to understand how Grossman can see the 
situation in the U.S. as approximating perfect competition or 
even as being significantly less oligopolistic than Britain.
59 See particularly R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society 
(New York, 1920).
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because of the increasing oligarchical and oligopolistic 
trends in industry. However, it is not private companies 
alone which threaten freedom; Imperial Chemicals and the 
Coal Board are very similar in their effect. The latter is 
just as concerned with its balance sheet as I.C.I. and thus, 
it cannot pursue a price policy based on the national in­
terest. It is not fully accountable to Parliament, and the 
degree of worker's participation is no more than that in 
progressive private companies. It may, in fact, be more 
difficult for technicians and the like to work for the Coal 
Board. Nationalization, as it has been carried out, has 
benefits in the government's control of capital investment 
and broad policy and in the increased stability which re­
sults from a decrease in unearned incomes and capital gains, 
but it was very far from Tawney's goal. Further, the growth 
of the state bureaucracy is another threat to democracy.
Those possessing power through economic concentration should 
be made fully accountable. Crossman adds;
Our Socialism is based on the traditional Radical 
demand for a society of free and equal citizens, 
reinforced by the empirical postulate that great 
concentrations of power become a menace to free­
dom and equality unless they are subjected to 
public control.80
Crossman maintains that the democratic socialist must carry
the trade unionists along with him even if this slows forward
progress. The trade unions, being a product of as well as a
60 Crossman, p. 7*
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reaction against capitalism, inherited some of the letter's 
characteristics. Thus, while the primary aim of a socialist 
might be the extension of public ownership, the necessary 
primary aim of the trade union leader is to improve wages 
and conditions of work from within a given economic system, 
even if this means giving the system added support. There 
is always a danger that the party will lose its Socialism 
and become merely an agent of trade union interests. So­
cialists should not expect the initiative in modern Socialism 
to come from either the trade unions or co-operatives. Cross­
man adds. Instead, it must come from the Labour party and it 
must be based not on economic ideas alone but also on poli­
tical ones such as freedom and responsibility. Since oli­
garchy is inevitable, one must either permit the oligopolies 
to operate as they do, or subject them to public control; and 
to ensure public control public ownership is necessary.
Since the general populace is not convinced of the merit 
of large scale nationalization the best method to proceed 
with. Crossman feels, is government takeover of those sectors 
of the economy where the beneficial results of public owner­
ship would be most obvious. But, in addition, every nation­
alized industry should be responsible to Parliament. Cross­
man's second aim is to make industries subject to some 
measure of worker's control. The only way trade unions in 
Britain would favor the continued nationalization of industry 
is if they see it in an increase in their own status.
Civil servants, who, in fact, control government depart-
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merits should be divested of such power. Such control should 
be returned to the elected representatives of the people by 
allowing Ministers to gain complete control of their depart­
ments by bringing with them a 'brain trust' of three or four 
advisors as a sort of departmental cabinet. In addition, 
ministers must be made more responsible to Parliament, and 
the electorate. Ministerial responsibility to Parliament, 
Crossman argues, is largely a matter of fiction; further, 
the position of the individual MP has been hampered as he is 
no longer primarily responsible to the electorate but to the 
party. There is a need for the democratization of Parliament. 
Such things as standing committes responsible for each 
nationalized industry could increase democracy and the status 
of the backbencher.
The post-war economic and social situation led to the 
development of two factions within the Labour party which 
served as the central forces in the ideological struggle of 
the 1950s. The positions of the two groups began to be seen, 
by their members, as being irreconcilable and this led to the 
creation of a situation where compromise was regarded as trea­
son. This split severely damaged the party as a whole, parti­
cularly its standing in the country. It was only once a 
general compromise was arrived at and relative unity restored 
that Labour was able to gain office.
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CHAPTER III
THE LABOUR PARTY AND POLICY FORMATION
Normally, one of the primary aims of party leadership 
in the two party system is to increase support among the 
electorate to the extent that this will result in its ob­
taining the margin of v i c t o r y . T h i s  is one of the central 
concerns of most party members, but it is more important to 
the party leader as his role makes him particularly sensi­
tive to the views of the electorate, as he has the distinct 
possibility of becoming Prime Minister. The knowledge that 
stress and cleavage within the party hinder electoral pros­
pects and seriously undermine party strength by adversely 
affecting the party image among the general populace lead 
him to attempt to increase this strength by increasing co­
hesion and decreasing cleavage and, as a result, stress.
But, at the same time, in Labour's case, too sharp a swing to 
the left would tend to alienate a significant number of vo­
ters in the centre of the political spectrum who provide the 
party with the necessary margin of victory. As a result, 
there is usually a tendency to balance concessions to the
61 The term leadership needs some clarification. While 
in its broad sense it includes all centres where a signifi­
cant power locus exists in certain contexts it refers to the 
majority leadership in the party which during the period under 
study was substantially moderate and/or revisionist. Similar­
ity the party leader was throughout the period moderate and/or 
revisionist and references to the role of leader presume that 
such was the case.
52
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left and concessions to the centre to obtain maximum returns 
in the sense of increased electoral strength. This would 
entail moving to the left on some issues where it was felt 
there would only be marginal losses of support in the centre 
and to the right on those issues where it was felt there 
would be only a marginal decrease in party strength through 
increased cleavage.
The Labour Party: 1951-1959 
The 1945 election manifesto of the Labour Party serves 
as a starting point for the following analysis, as it illus­
trates both the extent and the limits of Left-Wing influence 
on the formation of party policy. At the December, 1944 
Labour party conference, Ian Mikardo moved an amendment to 
commit the party in its election manifesto to the national­
ization of "land, large-scale building, heavy industry, and 
all forms of banking, transport, and fuel and p o w e r . T h e  
National Executive Committee (NEC) asked him not to press 
the matter to a vote. He did, and it was carried by such a 
majority that a card vote was not thought necessary. The 
Conference vote did, in fact, have its effect on the mani­
festo. Although there was little sympathy on the NEC for 
the nationalization of banks and the building industry, the 
manifesto promised that the banks would be 'harmonized' in 
their operation with the industrial sector and that 'drastic
62 Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference (Lon­
don, 1944), p. 160.
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action' would be taken to ensure the efficiency of the build­
ing industry. It is likely that the inclusion of iron and 
steel nationalization was decisively brought about by the 
Conference resolution, as the previous chances for its in­
clusion had neither been particularly bad nor good. The NEC 
subcommittee set up to prepare for the election had made no 
move to include iron and steel, but Hugh Dalton threatened 
to bring the whole matter up at Conference, "and then 
Morrison and Greenwood could explain to the delegates why 
this item, which had been enthusiastically adopted by the 
Conference only last December, had now vanishe d.M orr iso n 
acquiesced. It must, however, be remembered that Conference 
had this degree of influence only because there was support 
for such a move on the NEC. Mikardo himself seemed pleased 
enough with the result of his resolution:
Of course, I wasn't ... much disturbed by the 
fact that some points covered by my resolution 
were not included in Let Us Face the Future.
When one defeats the NEC one is quite happy 
with a ninety percent v i c t o r y .64
Of the 1945-46 session, though, Dalton said: "Yes, we were
all in step then."85
63 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years (London, 1957), pp.
432-433.
64 Quoted In S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collect­
ivist Age (New York, 1965), p. 178.
65 Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After (London, I962), p.
47
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The Left first began to gain real prominence in the 
public eye over foreign affairs with its opposition to 
Ernest Bevin's foreign policy. The main element in the 
group were the 'Keep Left' MBs, who began holding regular 
meetings in 1946. They were led by R.H.S. Crossman, Michael 
Foot, and Ian Mikardo who were chiefly responsible for the 
pamphlet Keen Left, which was published in May 194? and 
which provided a statement of principles. The pamphlet's 
central argument was that the government's policy was not a 
socialist foreign policy but rather, one of continuity. 
Following the 194/ Conference, in which Bevin obtained over­
whelming support for his policy, the 'Keep Left' revolt 
virtually came to an end. With its demise, the party again 
seemed to regain some of its cohesiveness, probably because 
of its absorption in the implementation of policy that had 
already been developed and the fear of damaging the party's 
chances of again forming the government after the next elec­
tion. This is not to say that there were not differences, 
but simply that they were largely hidden from the general 
public.
The 1950's saw the outbreak of severe internal strife, 
much of which took place in public and greatly weakened the 
position of the party in the country. In April 1951, both 
Bevan and Harold Wilson resigned from the cabinet, allegedly 
over the putting of a charge on dentures and spectacles. The 
real causes, however, went far deeper. In the first place.
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Bevan had been passed over at the Exchequer and the Foreign 
Office. Secondly, there was Morrison's determination to push 
the party to the right, for which he received strong support 
from Sir Arthur Deakin, Sir William Lawther, and Sir Thomas 
Williamson, the leading trade union leaders. Their attitudes 
towards the Left were at least, if not more, vociferous than 
those of the Left towards them. Bevan's position was clear­
ly stated: "I am not interested in the election of another 
Labour Government. I am interested in the election of a 
Government that will make Britain a socialist c o u n t r y . "86 
Morrison, however, was in a better position to influence 
policy because of his position as Chairman of the policy sub­
committee of the NEC and because of significant union sup­
port at Conference. He did not want a specific list of in­
dustries to be nationalized, rather, he wanted certain 
criteria laid down which could be used as a guide in future 
takeovers. Nevertheless, Bevan's pressure was partially 
successful. The 1950 election programme included proposals 
to take over sugar, cement and water, to nationalize cold 
storage, and to look into the possibility of taking over the 
chemical industry and agricultural land which was being in­
efficiently farmed, as well as to establish public firms 
to compete with private ones in sectors of the economy which
66 Quoted in Leslie Hunter, The Road to Brighton Pier 
(London, 1957), p. 22,
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were l a g g i n g , ^7 However, Morrison, after the election, gained 
support and, further, the Labour majority was too small to push 
through any controversial legislation.
.The split, an ideological one, was compounded by Sevan's 
struggle for power in the party. The Bevanite revolt con­
tinued for six years until the 1957 reconciliation with Gaits- 
kell, when Bevan became shadow Foreign Secretary. Yet, this 
eliminated only one of the sources of conflict; the ideologi­
cal cleavage remained. The party was still split, with from 
one quarter to one fifth of the PLP considering themselves on 
the left and continuing to retain an array of capable and 
intelligent spokesmen. The Bevanite struggle, although serv­
ing to illuminate the factions in the party, must be viewed 
in perspective as simply one phase of the continuing struggle 
for influence in the party. In fact, it could be argued that 
the Left's influence was less than it otherwise would have 
been during this period, especially after the election of 
Gaitskell to the party leadership. Bevan and Gaitskell's 
intransigence lessened the probability of arriving at work- . 
able compromises. It facilitated emotional, involvement but 
not understanding, Gaitskell's attempt to combine the lead­
ership of the party with the leadership of a faction and 
Bevan's attempt to combine the leadership of a faction with 
the role of heir apparent resulted in an intransigence where 
compromise was equated with betrayal. The influence of
67 Ibid.. p. 23
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Deakin, Lawther, and Williamson pressed Gaitskell further to 
the right; these men were far less willing to compromise than 
most groups in the party and the very intensity of the strug­
gle over Clause IV illustrates this.^® It might be asked how 
important the rephrasing of the clause to show that national­
ization was only one of a number of means leading to the 
attainment of Socialism really was. It might be argued that 
its emotional value to certain elements on the left was suf­
ficient to let it stand, and that the certain damage the 
party would suffer as the result of a long and protracted 
struggle would be reason enough to let the matter lie. 
Gaitskell, obviously, rejected this line of reasoning and 
again involved himself in another divisive struggle in which 
he was defeated.
There could be no greater contrast than that of Gaitskell 
and Attlee. The latter managed to hold his party together as 
a relatively cohesive whole for some time. The 'Keep Left' 
group had advocated the establishment of a Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, while a letter to the New Statesman by Percy Daine, 
MP, which was published anonymously, started an 'Attlee must 
go' movement. Cripps tried to assume the leadership of this 
group, but Attlee avoided letting things get too far out of 
hand and decided to create a Ministry of Economic Affairs to 
offer to Cripps. "Not for the first time Attlee had shown 
his ability to bend just enough with the wind to avoid being
68 See Chapter I, p. 5, note 9.
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torn up by his roots."89 Attlee was the man of compromise 
and, as a result, he managed to maintain a party which ap­
peared to be relatively cohesive, thus increasing the party’s 
power as a whole at the expense of concessions to factions in 
the party. Gaitskell's policy was the opposite, he refused 
to compromise. His tenure as party leader exacerbated the 
most serious rift that had ever occurred within Labour's 
ranks. The personality of a leader can be decisive in 
policy formation and party cohesiveness.
The central phases of the conflict were marked by the
general elections of 1951, 1955, and 1959. When elections
were at its doorstep the party made an effort to plaster over
the cracks and put up a united front, but each time it went
down to defeat the conflict would rise again to its full 
70height. Bevan led a strong faction which had representa­
tives from all the most important sectors of the party. The 
chief figures were Wilson, Crossman, Driberg, Mikardo,
Barbara Castle and, of course, Bevan himself. Further, sup­
port was strong among such unions as the Engineers and the 
Shop and Distributive workers, and the constituency parties 
lent a strong contingent. Although support was somewhat less 
in the PLP than at Conference, the Left could usually count 
on from one quarter to one fifth of all MPs and on important
69 Hunter, p. 19.
70 For a detailed historical account of the party split 
in the 1950s see Hunter and Carl F. Brand, The British Labour 
Party (Stanford, 1964), pp. 267-297*
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issues this could be raised to almost half.^^
Robert Michels submitted the theory of the iron law of 
oligarchy, which can in certain respects be considered sub­
stantially correct. But a look at the Labour party during 
the period under study suggests that the horizontal split 
between leadership and mass membership, which Michels sug­
gested was the norm, may in fact be an abnormal occurrence.^^
In fact, the Labour party's history suggests a vertical 
split which results from the competition of elites within the 
party, whose ties with MPs and members generally are stronger 
than those enjoyed with other segments of the leadership. The 
story of the Labour party during these crisis years presents 
a picture of competing factions; one of which was heavily re­
presented on the Parliamentary Committee, as well as in the 
remaining sectors of the party, and the other, with substan­
tial support in the PLP and the mass organization, occupying a
73position of seeming opposition to the Parliamentary Committee.'-^
71 For instance, on Feb. 23/54 the Parliamentary Party 
agreed by a vote of 113 to 109 to support German rearmament.
A motion opposing German rearmament introduced by Wilson lost 
by a vote of 109-111. See S.H. Beer, p. 221.
72 Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York, 1962).
73 The fact that the Parliamentary Committee was over­
whelmingly composed of moderates and revisionists should not 
suggest that a Labour cabinet would follow the same pattern. 
The Parliamentary Committee is elected by MPs and a majority 
of them consistently place moderates on the front benches. 
Once in office, however, the party leader chooses his cabinet 
with an eye to maximizing his support and as a result, the 
Left gains significant though minority representation.
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Although the revisionists were usually able to gain majority 
support, this was done only by means of substantial conces­
sions to leftist views.
The theory that there is a leadership-membership split 
in the Labour party is usually accompanied by the argument 
that the parliamentary leadership by using trade union sup­
port is able to assure passage of its policies both in the 
PLP and at Conference.?^ But over the period under considera­
tion, the trade unions did not form a cohesive bloc; rather 
they were divided in their support. Elitist analysis dis­
torts several factors, the most important of which is the 
fact that Aneurin Bevan, whether on the Parliamentary Commit­
tee or not, was a member of the highest echelon of party 
leadership, and with his associates was extremely influential 
in a number of different sectors of the party.
The conflict did not consist in a struggle between 
elites but in the clash of two currents of opinion, 
each running strongly throughout the party. During 
the Bevanite period the conflict was exacerbated 
by 'A ferocious struggle for the succession.' But 
the clash of opinion had already begun before 
Bevan made his bid for power and it rose to new 
heights of intensity after Bevan had made his peace 
with Gaitskell in 1957. The initiative in conduct­
ing the conflict was not monopolized by the leader­
ship of the respective factions, but was widely 
diffused in the various sectors and at various 
levels of the party - not only at Conference, but
74 See particularly Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and 
Leaders ; the Social Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 
1963)," pp. I5I-I52, and R.T. McKenzie, British Political 
Parties (London, 1955).
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on theJLEC, PLP and Parliamentary Committee as 
well.??
The Party Conference 
In theory, Conference is the supreme policy making organ 
of the party. While the vast majority of pluraliste, as well 
as elitists, would reject this view and, although numerous 
commentators on the British political scene, both analytical 
and historical, show that this is not the case, the myth per­
sists among certain sectors of the Labour party. Yet it can 
be argued that the mood of Conference can play its role in 
affecting party policy. The important fact here is that 
Conference decisions are binding in the sense that they should 
not be contravened.?8 The NEC is by no means assured of an 
absolute majority at Conference and, therefore, in formula­
ting its policy submissions it must take into account the mood 
of Conference. Although there are no means by which Conference 
can make the NEC accept its decisions, since the latter could 
not go on indefinitely facing a hostile Conference and since, 
on the other hand, it could not be publicly forced to change 
its position in deference to Conference, the only real alter-
75 S.H. Beer, p. 232. For historical accounts of the 
major policy disputes, see Henry Polling, A Short History of 
The Labour Party (London, 1965), Leslie Hunter, The Road to 
Brighton Pier, Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party, S.H. 
Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age and Ivor Bulmer- 
Thomas, The Growth of the British Party System (London, 1965).
76 Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition," Political 
Studies. IV, no. 2 (June, 1956), 130.
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native once informai pre-Conference means have been ex­
hausted is to secure support for a policy by compromise.
While the McKenzie thesis concerning Conference-NEC 
relationships is in part true, he overstates his case. Even 
if the thesis demonstrates that Conference cannot force its 
policies down the throat of the leadership, this does not 
prove that the Labour party in its organization, is basical­
ly similar to its Conservative counterpart. The party lead­
ership is not prepared to accept defeat on the floor, as a 
continuance of defeats on important Issues could not help, 
but rather, undermine its support at Conference, among the 
PLP, and among the electorate. "Normally the NEC is care­
ful to prepare its v i c t o r i e s . " ? ?  One of the most important 
means at hand to accomplish this is a policy of compromise. 
Even if all other arguments are dismissed. Conference still 
retains a degree of influence simply because many delegates 
refuse to accept the theory that it is impotent. The Labour 
party is forced to work within a system in which all major 
items and policies will be discussed and on which a vote will 
be taken. The necessity of discussing policy issues in pub­
lic forces the leadership to try to obtain as impressive a 
majority as possible. As long as the Labour tradition con­
cerning Conference is such as it was in the 1950s, and as 
long as issues must be aired in public, the leadership is
77 Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party 
Since 194-5 (London, I960), p. 204.
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going to continually concern itself with obtaining the sup­
port of as large a section of the party as is reasonably 
possible.
Of the two most important groupings at Conference, the 
unions and the constituency organizations, the unions refuse 
to accent adverse Conference decisions in matters that con­
cern them directly. And on the most important industrial 
questions, such as wages and the conditions of work, dis­
cussion is barred by mutual consent. This gives the unions 
a greater freedom of manoeuvre and isolates them, in this 
respect, from the glare of publicity. Nevertheless, it has 
not been the habit of the unions to abstain on matters of 
concern to the constituency organizations, such as discipline 
and organization. But they do tend to leave the initiative 
on major issues to the leadership on the Conference floor.
Yet the leadership itself goes to great pains in order to 
assure itself of adequate support on the floor by means of 
prior private consultation with the heads of the major unions, 
thus barring the chance of defeat and the appearance of being 
out of step with the membership. What significant trade 
union interference there was in the 1952-55 period was the 
result of fear on the part of Deakin and other right-wing , 
trade unionists that the danger from the Bevanites was so 
serious that intervention was mandatory.
The agenda from which the Conference works seems to be 
extremist and suggests a leftist rank, and file. Union par-
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ticlpatlon is insignificant compared with the constituencies, 
as unions usually turn for policy leads to the TUC and fur­
ther, they usually have their say before Conference when the 
NEC is looking for a means to secure its majority. In addi­
tion, the unions are heavily represented on the NEC.
A substantial number of unions vote fairly consistently 
with the leftists in the constituencies. Among them are the 
Electrical Trades Union, the Fire Brigades Union, and the 
Foundry Workers. They were able to add considerable support 
to leftists in the constituences.
Up to 1956, 2.8 million votes regularly supported 
the NEC, 1.8 million were solidly on the left, and 
one million were unpredictable ... Since 1956 the 
blocks of left and right wing union votes have
been even less cohesive.
Conference votes consistently show this trend. However, there
are a substantial number of unions which submit no resolutions
at Conference, most of them being relatively small. Some of
the larger unions, particularly the National Union of Mine-
workers and the National Union of General and Municipal
Workers, put down what might be called 'loyal resolutions',
some of them even being initiated by the NEC.79
Since the constituencies use about one third of the
Conference time, and the unions somewhat less than half that.
78 Ibid.. p. 230. For an analysis of the position of 
individual trade unions on major policy issues during the 
post-war period see pp. 195-261.
79 A significant portion of the above discussion has been 
based on Harrison's book.
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the myth grew that the unions were conservative and the 
constituencies radical, this representing the great division 
in the party. Upon analysis, this view proves to be dras­
tically oversimplified. A study by Richard Rose done in 1962 
states:
The analysis immediately reveals that the descrip­
tion of local parties as a force constantly pres­
sing extremist views upon national party leaders 
is false ... constituency parties are nearly as 
apt to be voicing views derived from general cul­
tural values or from interest group links as they 
are to voice those clearly associated with a par­
tisan ideology.oO
The following table illustrates this.
Table 2
Total Scores of Labour Constituency Resolutions^^
Year Left Partisan Right Non-Partisan Total
1955 123 98 5 198 424
1956 109 119 5 169 402
1957 127 140 4 172 443
1958 173 89 6 160 428
1959 152 73 3 186 4l4
I960 209 91 12 216 528
Total No. 893 610 35 1101 2639
Percent 34 23 1 42 100
Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party 
Activists", The American Political Science Review, 
LVI, (June, 1962)7 364.
80 Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party 
Activists," The American Political Science Review. LVI,
no. 2 (June, 1962), 364.
81 Partisan is defined as the "enumeration of an agreed 
party policy which is opposed to that of the other party and
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Somewhat less than one quarter of the constituency 
organizations press partisan views consistently as the fol­
lowing table indicates.
Table 3
8?Partisanship in Labour Constituencies
Category No. Percent
No partisan resolutions 88 18
Low (12.5 - hO%) partisanship 83 17
Average (4l - 75%) partisanship 208 4-2
High (above 75^) partisanship 113 23
Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists", The American Political Science Review.
LVI, (June, 1962), 3647"
Partisanship, since it reflects only differences in attitudes 
between the Labour and other parties, is not a factor in 
party cohesiveness except as a possible positive force. By 
definition, the leadership would share the attitudes put forth 
in the resolutions. On the other hand, ideological extremism 
might be a significant factor in lessening cohesion in the 
party but Rose's findings indicate that this is not nearly as 
widespread as is sometimes thought.
which has an ideological basis." Non-partisan is defined as 
"the enumeration of a policy which is not the subject of con­
troversy along party lines." See Rose, p. 362.
82 Constituencies presenting only a single resolution 
and that partisan are omitted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
Table 4
Extremism in Labour Parties®^
Category No. Percent
No extremist resolutions 191 38
Low extremism (20# or less) 47 9
Average (25 - 50#) extremism 172 35
High (above 50#) extremism 87 18
Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party 
Activists", The American Political Science Review,
LVI, (June, 1962), 336.
The findings show that only one extremist resolution 
will be brought to the floor per constituency every six years. 
Further examination shows that pressure and interest group 
ties were far stronger in a significant number of areas than 
were ideological or even simple partisan ones.®^ With regard 
to education, welfare services, transport and pensions, lack 
of partisan and extremist positions was particularly notice­
able as the table on page 69 shows.
It seems there was considerable diversity and flexibili­
ty in the attitudes of party activists. Simply because they 
were interested and active, is not cause enough to label them 
extremists. It is in comparison with the apathy of the trade 
unions, a very small percentage of whose members took part in 
party and Conference activities, that the constituency parties
83 Ibid.
84 Rose, p. 366.
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Table 5
Topics for Labour Resolutions
Non-
Topic Left Partisan Right Partisan To ta:
Foreign policy,defence 594 145 14 20 773
Economic affairs 117 l4l 10 188 456
Housing and land 10 85 - 80 175
Party organization 14 4 1 130 148
Pensions 2 1 - 143 146
Welfare services 9 31 - 94 132
Education 17 19 - 64 100
Commonwealth & colonies 8 82 3 1 94
Local government 7 43 44 94
Socialist principles 57 15 2 5 79
Transportation 4 3 - 56 63
Party unity 18 2 1 31 52
Industrial relations 6 13 - - 19
Miscellaneous 32 26 4 245 306
Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party 
Activists," The American Political Science Review. 
LVI, (June, 1962), 367.
appear to be extremely partisan. In fact, if the left-wing 
activists had to rely solely on the support they could muster 
among the constituency parties, support for their resolutions 
would be insignificant. In I960, constituency members con­
trolled only thirteen percent of the vote. This had declined
85for some years from seventeen percent in 1952. Almost all 
other votes are controlled by the trade unions. It should be 
clear that the ideological lines in the party were vertical
85 These figures are taken from Leon D. Epstein, "Who 
Makes Party Policy: British Labour 1960-61," Midwest Journal 
of Political Science. VI, no. 2 (May, 1962), 167.
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and not horizontal; although certain views tended to prevail 
in one sector of the party to a greater degree than they did 
in others. This, however, is simply a function of time and 
place.
Over the span of its history there has been a tendency 
on the part of the party to move away from the left. But 
tradition can still be an important variable exercising a 
restraining influence on the public expression of policy which 
is notably right-wing. As a result, the leadership tended to 
be closer to the middle in the party than often seemed to be 
the case. Although certain major unions had occasion to dis­
agree with the policies of the NEC, a number of unions are 
more than likely to acquiesce.However, about twelve unions 
usually found themselves on the extreme left; a few of these 
were under a degree of Communist influence, their leadership 
being forced to take extreme positions in order to maintain 
o f f i c e . D u r i n g  the Bevanite period, fairly consistent sup­
port was given by the moderate left to the Bevanites. But 
the dissolution of the revolt gave way to a somewhat more
86 The National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile 
Workers, the National Society of Pattern Workers, the Pruden­
tial Staff unions, the National Association of Theatrical and 
Kine Employees and the Scottish Baker's union.
87 The Electrical Trades Union, the National Union of 
Vehicle Builders, the Constructional Engineering Union, the 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, the National Society of 
Metal Mechanics, the United Society of Boilermakers, Ship­
builders and Structural Workers, the Chemical Worker's Union, 
The Tobacco Workers union and the Fire Brigades union.
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flexible attitude. Other unions, such as the Post Office 
Workers, have floated continually between opposition and 
support of the NEC.^^
It was the Transport and General Workers Union, under 
Frank Cousins, that first brought home the fact that the NEC 
could not be assured of a majority at Conference. Therefore, 
official policy had to be shaped in such a way as to obtain 
at a minimum, a bare majority. Of trie six largest unions in 
the TUC, it was invariable that two or three should be found 
in the opposition ranks. The unions have always had a pro­
gressive element, but not to the same extent as the constitu­
ency parties. It was the very fact of division in the unions 
that enabled the Left to muster the degree of support it did, 
and thus to compel the leadership, on numerous occasions, to 
adjust its policy accordingly.
The Parliamentary Party and the Leadership 
The PLP assumes a far greater role in policy formation 
than does Conference; and the leadership must carefully weigh 
the strength of various factions and tendencies when formula­
ting party policy. However, to fully understand the process 
it is best to begin with an analysis of the positions and
88 The Amalgamated Engineering Union, the National Union 
of Railwayman, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers, the National Union of Furniture Trade Operatives,the 
Plumbing Trades Union,the Association of Engineering and Ship­
building Draughtsmen and the National Union of Tailors and 
Garment Workers.
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attitudes of the members of the PLP, the Labour MPs. In 
attempting to ascertain attitudes, the division lists are of 
no use because of the effectiveness of whipping. However, 
Early Day motions (EDMs) are available for analysis. They are 
"spontaneous unwhipped backbench manifestos"®^ which any MP 
can table, and to which any can add their names in support.
The freedom to sign a backbench manifesto is the same as the 
freedom to ask questions. However, from 1952 to 1959, the 
Labour whips had to be informed of a members intention to 
table such a motion. But the motions were regarded as the 
exclusive right of the backbencher. The EDMs indicate what 
views backbenchers have freely committed themselves to; but . 
the haphazard method employed to collect signatures may well 
affect the degree of professed support. Nevertheless, the 
results of the tests show that there is a highly significant 
correlation between the type of member and the views expressed. 
Frontbenchers and whips were exluded because they were not in 
a position to freely express their opinion. Therefore, of the 
277 Labour MPs, only 236 were classified as backbenchers.
The type of member was determined by the use of three 
main categories: occupation, education and sponsorship.
89 3.E. Finer, H.B. Berrington and D.J. Bartholomew, 
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons (London, I96I), p. 
7. This excellent study is the only one of its type avail­
able but it is unfortunately confined to the life of the 
1955-1959 Parliament. However, the authors maintain that 
attitudes in tne 1951-55 Parliament were very similar to 
those of their successor, p. I3I.
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Occupation was broken down into three groupings: workers 
(including full time union officials, of whom there were 79 
or 33 percent), the professions (including lawyers, doctors 
and teachers, of whom there were 73 or 31 percent) and the 
miscellaneous occupations (a residuary category composed of 
various white collar workers, such as publishers. Journal­
ists and party organizers, for whom politics was the chief 
activity, and of whom there were 61 or 26 percent).
Sponsorship was similarly broken down into three groupings. 
Seventy eight or 30 percent of the backbenchers were spon­
sored by the trade unions, 21 or 9 percent were sponsored by 
the co-operatives, and 137 or ^8 percent were sponsored by 
the constituency organizations. Educational groupings were: 
elementary (77 or 32 percent of the members), secondary (58 
or 25 percent), and university (93 or 39 percent).
Two wings emerged: working class and professional, with 
the miscellaneous occupations in the centre having character­
istics similar to both. Using sponsorship as a category, nine 
percent of the professions were sponsored by the trade unions, 
5^ by the constituencies, and 2k by the co-operatives. Re­
garding trade unionists, 80 percent were sponsored by the 
trade unions, and ten percent each by the co-operatives and 
the constituencies. The miscellaneous occupations were the
90 The Labour party has a fourth occupational category, 
businessmen. But it so small that it was left out of the 
general analysis; however, its exclusion tends to distort some 
of the figures.
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most highly represented in the co-operative groups with 52 
percent, while six percent were sponsored by the trade unions 
and 33 percent by the constituencies.
Regarding education, 71 percent of the trade unionists 
had elementary schooling, 27 percent secondary, and one percent 
university. Seventeen percent of the miscellaneous occupations 
had elementary schooling, ^6 percent secondary, and 22 percent 
university. In the professions, eight percent received only 
elementary education, eight percent secondary and 67 percent 
university. Of the workers, then, the bulk had only elementary 
schooling; of the miscellaneous occupations, the bulk had sec­
ondary; and of the professions, the bulk had university. From 
this it is possible to conclude that the correspondence between 
occupation and education tended to be close.
o
Several major policy Issues will be discussed below.
Foreign policy, and in particular, attitudes towards the hydro­
gen bomb and pacifism will be dealt with first. The table on the 
following page serves to illustrate attitudes towards the latter.
The correlation between occupation and pacifism indicated 
that the miscellaneous occupations were the most leftist and 
that the workers and professions had views which tended to be 
both right-wing and similar. Analysis of sponsorship group­
ings indicated that those sponsored by the co-operatives were 
the most pacifist and that those sponsored by the trade unions 
and the constituencies held views that tended to coincide.
There was no significant correlation in the general occupa­
tional categories; but those who graduated from Redbrick
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T a b le  6
Backbench Labour Views on Pacifism and the Hydrogen Bomb
Category No. Percent
Left: unilateral renunciation of tests and/ 
or manufacturing of the bomb 45 19
Centre: those not in the category above but 
opposing American hydrogen bomb pat­
rols and/or missile bases 68 29
Right: those in neither of the above cate­
gories but favoring disarmament 82 35
Uncommitted: those expressing none of the 
previous attitudes 41 17
236 100
Source: S.E. Finer et al. Backbench Opinion in the House of 
Commons (London, 1961), p. 26.
universities tended to support pacifism while those from 
Oxbridge tended to oppose it.
On German rearmament, 44- MPs could be classified as left- 
wing, l44 as centre, and 86 as right, while 62 failed to ex­
press any opinion. The only type classification in which a 
relationship could be established was sponsorship. Co-operative- 
sponsored MPs tended to be left, constituency-sponsored, centre, 
and trade union-sponsored, right. There was, in addition, a 
close correlation of views between the German rearmament issue 
and pacifism. The overlap of leftists on these issues was 60 
percent. There were five motions dealing with anti-colonial- 
isra. The Left was here defined as being composed of those who 
signed three or more motions, that is, 28 MPs, the centre as
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those who signed two motions (48), the right as those who 
signed one motion (103), while a further 103 refrained from 
signing. The miscellaneous occupations were again the most 
radical, the workers the least, while the professions stood 
midway. Co-operative and constituency members were equally 
left-wing, while trade union members occupied the right end 
of the scale. Education was not a significant variable on 
colonial matters.
On civil liberties, 27 MPs signed three or more motions 
which placed them on the left, 48 signed two motions which 
placed them in the centre, 68 signed only one which placed 
them on the right, while 93 signed no motions. But a good 
case can be made for the argument that uncommitted members 
tended to stand further to the right than those who signed 
the motions, thus pushing the whole scale to the left. 
Educational analysis revealed that those with secondary 
education were the most enthusiastic, that university gradu­
ates stood midway, and that those with elementary education 
were the most conservative. The remaining two categories 
were not significant as far as their relationship with the 
issue was concerned.
Humanitarian issues revealed a similar split, with 45 
MPs signing three or four motions and thus falling into the 
left-wing category, 84 signing two motions and thus falling 
into the centre grouping, 73 signing only one and thus being 
placed on the right, while 34 MPs signed no motions and were, 
therefore, categorized as uncommitted. In the occupational
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groupings, the miscellaneous occupations were the furthest 
left, the professions were in the centre, while workers 
occupied a position on the right. In the sponsorship group­
ings, the co-operators were the most enthusiastic, the con­
stituency members were split between left and centre, and 
the right was occupied by members sponsored by the trade 
unions. Education did not prove to be a significant variable
With regard to social welfare, in general, those signing 
five or six motions, of whom there were 45, were categorized 
as very keen, those signing three or four motions, of whom 
there were 80, were categorized as keen, those signing one or 
two motions, of whom there were 8l, were categorized as mod­
erate, while 25 MPs registered no opinion. As could be ex­
pected, the trade union sponsored members were strongest in 
support, the constituency sponsored members stood at the 
opposite extreme, while the co-operative sponsored members 
stood midway, half being keen and very keen and the other 
half moderate. The educational split followed expected lines. 
Those with only elementary education were the most keen, those 
with university education the least keen, and those with sec­
ondary education were themselves split, some being keen or 
very keen, some being moderate.
The table on page 78 helps to clarify the above by show­
ing the correlation between attitudes in the PLP.
91
91 All figures on backbench attitudes are taken from 
Finer; the H-bomb and pacifism, pp. 23-28; foreign affairs, 
pp. 28-38; anti-colonialsim, pp. 38-40; civil liberties, pp. 
aO-43; humanitarianism, pp. 43-44; and social welfare, pp. 
44-48.
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T a b le  7
92
Correlation Between Attitudes in the Labour Party
Humanitar­
ian] sra
1.00 0.41 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.21 0.22 0.13
Civil
liberties 1.00 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.22 0.15
Foreign
policy 1.00 0.36 0.39 0.23 0.27 0.21
Anti-colo­
nialism 1.00 0.32 0.19 0.20 0.09
Pacifism 1.00 0.3^ 0.19 0.21
Welfare 1.00 0.33 0.29
Cost of 
living 1.00 0.33
Health & 
education 1.00
H CL FP A-C P w CL H&E
Source: S.E. Finer et al. Backbench Opinion in the House of 
Commons (London, 1961), p. 56.
As can be seen there is a strong correlation between 
some attitudes. The closer any two items stand on the scale, 
the closer is the correlation between the two. If a member 
was placed opposite the issue about which he felt strongest, 
the probability is that his next greatest concern would have 
been the item immediately above or below. As he progressed 
up or down the scale, the intensity of feeling would have 
tended to diminish. It is impossible to measure attitudes
92 Two important areas, nationalization and egalitarian­
ism do not figure in the analysis as no motions were tabled 
on either topic. The letters on the horizontal scale represent 
the same issues, in the same order, as those on the vertical 
scale.
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in absolute terms; all that is dealt with are tendencies.
There is no means of weighing the intensity of radicalism for 
any one member, when one compares one area with another. Thus, 
while a member might appear to have been equally left on two 
given issues according to the EDM analysis, the intensity of 
feeling may have been much greater in one case than in the 
other.
Trade unionists tended to be right-wing on every ideolo­
gical issue and radical on every material i s s u e . ^3 They 
formed a separate and relatively cohesive group in the House, 
where elementary education, trade union sponsorship and oc­
cupation tended to coincide. The professions and those with 
university education largely coincided and on material issues, 
the professions were at the opposite end from the workers. On 
pacifism their attitude was the same as the workers, while on 
all other issues their position was in the middle of the 
scale. The miscellaneous occupations were a counterweight to 
the workers; on material issues they took the same stand as 
the professions except on the high cost of living, which was 
in part, the result of the ideological phrasing of the motions. 
On every ideological issue the miscellaneous occupations were 
left-wing.
The party is, broadly speaking, polarized on ideo­
logical matters between the left-wing Miscellane­
ous Occupations and the right-wing Workers. With
93 The issues classed as ideological are: humanitarian­
ism, civil liberties, foreign policy, anti-colonialism and 
pacifism; those classed as material are: welfare, cost of 
living and health and education. Finer, p. 57*
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the Professions mainly taking the middle view; 
and on material matters between the left-wing 
Workers and the right-wing Professions and 
Miscellaneous Occupations.94-
Sponsorship groupings show that the position of those 
members sponsored by the trade unions was similar to that of 
the workers. This was because of the 80 percent overlap. 
Eighty percent of the constituency members belonged to the 
miscellaneous occupations and professions. But their posi­
tion tended to be similar to that of the professions; on 
material issues they were always right-wing and on ideolo­
gical issues they shifted. Co-operative sponsored members 
showed no high degree of correlation either with occupational 
or educational groupings; although ten out of twenty one co­
operative sponsored members belonged to the miscellaneous 
occupations, and tended to be more radical than the others.
Those with only elementary school were almost solely 
trade union sponsored members who were on the right on all 
ideological matters and on the left on all material issues. 
University education overlapped with both the miscellaneous 
occupations and the professions. Such members tended to be 
on the right on material issues. But there were numerous 
variations on ideological issues. The grammar schools pro­
duced more radical MPs than did the public schools, as did 
the Redbrick universities in comparison with Oxbridge.
On material issues the impetus for action came from 
members sponsored by the trade unionists, workers, and those
94 Ibid., pp. 62-63
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with elementary school education. If these are all brought 
together they total 120, or one half of the backbench. This, 
however, is the outside limit; the core totals about 55 
members. These members were simultaneously sponsored by the 
trade unions, were workers, and had only an elementary or 
secondary education. When ideology was concerned, this group 
tended to be right-wing. Here its chief opposition stemmed 
from members sponsored by the co-operative societies who be­
longed to the miscellaneous occupations and had secondary 
school and/or Redbrick university training. When brought to­
gether, the total reaches 85. Of the 13 backbench Labour 
revolts in the 194-5-55 period, the average number of partici­
pants was about 50, although over 200 members were connected 
with at least one of the i n c i d e n t s . The attitude of the 
professions seemed decisive. Whoever they sided with tended 
to gain a majority on the backbench; and therefore with uni­
lateralism the correspondence of views between the trade 
unionists and professions was almost identical. But with 
regard to such matters as anti-colonialism, the professions 
have tended to support the views of the miscellaneous 
occupations.
There were several trends which began to appear in the 
period under study that may become significant. Although
95 See Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members : A Study of 
the British Backbencher (London, 1959), pp. Ï4-7-148 for more 
detailed information.
96 Finer, pp. 74-75.
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following the war there was a rise in the number of candi­
dates sponsored by the trade unions, many such candidates 
were not workers. Further, the number of working class mem­
bers with safe seats declined and the number with marginal 
seats increased. Partial explanations lie in the facts that 
the unions are unwilling to contest other than safe seats 
and that the increased strength of the constituency parties 
made it harder for trade unionists to win nominations. One 
of the main difficulties is that the trade unions are not 
willing to sponsor men that have the qualifications the 
Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) are looking for. Although 
the trade union leadership could provide the CLPs with the 
type of members that would benefit it, the unwillingness of 
such officials to leave their trade union posts precludes 
this on an extensive s c a l e . 97 This results in a tendency 
for the professions and the miscellaneous occupations to in­
crease their membership in the PLP. There is a further tend­
ency for trade union members to be older and to have entered 
the House at an earlier date than members in the other group­
ings. Age was not a significant factor as far as material 
issues went. But on certain ideological matters there was a 
tendency for younger members to be more radical, indicating 
that in the future such matters as anti-colonialism and
q O
humanitarianism are likely to receive a wider range of support.
97 Harrison, pp. 262-306, provides an extensive analysis 
of the problem.
98 Finer, pp. 72-73* .
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Comparatively little can be done on the floor of the 
House to influence policy decisions. Concerning the forma­
tion of a cabinet, Herbert Morrison stated;
There is a tendency, therefore, for the leading 
and most influential members of the party to find 
a place, and even for the deliberate inclusion of 
varying political temperaments and approaches pro­
vided there are fair prospects of their being able 
to work together, in order that the maximum good­
will of all elements of the parliamentary party 
may be obtained ...In a sense the two great parties 
are each coalitions of opinion within themselves.99
The same principle applies to a party in opposition. To go 
to the polls with divided ranks, particularly if the other 
party were able to present a stronger and more cohesive image, 
would be to invite defeat. It is far easier for the Con­
servative party to do this because of the amount of deference 
afforded the party leader and the higher degree of concern 
for the attainment and maintenance of office. This, again in­
creases the necessity of Labour making significant efforts to 
increase cohesion. A Parliamentary Committee or cabinet 
which attempted to drive its policies down the throats of its 
backbenchers would, before long, be faced with a significant 
degree of discontent and resentment which might culminate in 
a backbench revolt. This spirit of discontent, Morrison 
maintains, flows back to the constituency parties, where it 
dampens enthusiasm and hinders co-operation. This was specif­
ically the case in the months preceding the- 1951 electoral 
campaign. This,factor played its part in the electoral de-
99 Herbert Morrison,- Government and Parliament (London, 
1964), p. 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84-
feat of that year.
There are numerous channels through which the leadership 
is made aware of backbench feeling. Meetings between minis­
ters and members are frequent; appointments can be arranged 
with ministers; conversations can take place in the environs 
of the House; the whips and the EDMs keep the front benches 
informed of the attitudes of members; and discussions in the 
subject committees of the party are influential. Influence 
on policy is generally organized in a more subtle way than 
change on the floor of the House. The leadership usually 
tries to anticipate party reaction before policy is made pub­
lic, and adjust it, if it feels it can, a c c o r d i n g l y .
Michael Foot, one of the Left’s chief spokesmen, stated;
The Labour MP who seeks to change or effect great 
decisions must persuade his colleagues in the 
secret conclave of the party meeting. True, he 
will have had the chance of pressing his view at 
an earlier meeting of a specialized official 
group. But if his powers of advocacy fail there 
or if the political crisis in which he is con­
cerned breaks suddenly, as most important crises 
do, it is in the party meeting - not the floor of 
the House of Commons - that he will have the only 
opportunity to determine action.101
The Political Correspondent of the Times said in a June 27,
i960 article that "this [the backbench committee) is where
things are being said and done that are more politically
meaningful than a great deal that passes in the Chamber it
100 The most extensive discussion of this type of in­
fluence available is in Richards, pp. 90-142.
101 Quoted in Finer, p. 3*
D I i r e S S Y O l
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self." He maintained that to prove this empirically would 
be fascinating but then added that it was "humanly impossible. 
Privacy is the essence of the backbench committee system."1^2 
Parties must be sharply distinguished in two facets of 
their operations; as electoral machines and as policy making 
institutions. Differences within parties are often just as 
important as differences between parties. This is certainly 
the case in twentieth-century British political history. The 
strongest intraparty divisions have usually been vertical, 
not horizontal. Three elements can be isolated within the 
Labour party when this line of reasoning is pursued; factions, 
tendencies and non-aligned partisans.1^3 ^ faction is defined
as a "group of individuals based on representatives in Parlia­
ment who seek to further a broad range of policies through 
consciously organized political a c t i v i t y . A  faction is 
a definite grouping which serves to bring direct influence to 
bear on the policy making process. A tendency refers to cer­
tain attitudes spanning a large area of policy objectives 
which are joined by a general view of society. The number of 
supporters of a tendency on any given issue will vary, and 
there is never any self-conscious organization. Non-aligned 
partisans tend to support the general principles of the party
102 Ibid.. p. 4
103 The ensuing analysis has been adopted from Richard 
Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political 
Studies. XII, no. 1 (Feb., 1964), 33-46.
104 Ibid.
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rather than those of any specific subgroup within it. It is 
these non-aligned partisans that the factions and tendencies 
attempt to mobilize in support of their policy objectives 
when differences within the party became significant. Policy 
parties are neither totally factions or tendencies; instead, 
the two tend to combine to become the former. Thus, the 
Bevanite faction often relied on the support of those with 
leftist tendencies. These policy parties do not tend to 
operate regularly. Instead, they come to the fore as co­
hesiveness diminishes.
The chief features of the policy party, parti­
cularly a consciously organized faction, appear 
to be an ideology, leadership, limited technical 
expertise, cadres, a communications network, and 
rewards whether material or psychological.
During the Bevanite period the left-wing faction held regular 
meetings with an agenda and minutes, conducted political in­
formation campaigns through its own periodicals, and held re­
gular meetings in the constituencies. Further, because 
factions were particularly strong in the Labour party, the 
support of non-aligned partisans gained increased importance. 
Their support of lack of it was often the decisive factor in 
policy disputes.
Accuracy of information is of vital importance if the 
leadership is going to be able to balance the factions with 
any degree of success and this, in turn, limits the leadership's 
freedom of action. In addition, personality influences the
105 Ibid.. p. 39.
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degree to which a leader will head a united front, Attlee 
began his career as a very weak leader and usually exercised 
a degree of deference to Cripps and Bevin. His personal 
authority tended to increase when both of the above left 
office in 1951* But by 1955, when he retired, it had again 
diminished. Gaitskell, in contrast to Attlee, who had 
usually attempted to arrange some type of compromise, assumed 
office as the leader of a faction. This combination of roles 
led to a number of bitterly divisive struggles.
A last possible source of policy is the NEC, which is 
theoretically the administrative arm of Conference. Professor 
McKenzie claims that it is heavily influenced by the trade 
unions and that as long as the parliamentary leadership re­
tains the confidence of the trade union leaders they will have 
no difficulty controlling the policy recommendations of the 
NEC.30® Again it appears that McKenzie’s analysis is slight­
ly oversimplified. The NEC consists of 26 members, 12 of whom 
are trade unionists. But there is no guarantee that all trade 
unionists will support the leadership. Although, if the pat­
tern of policy decisions in the PLP is any indication, it 
would be safe to assume that there would be a strong tendency 
for the majority, at a minimum, to do so.
The relationship between the PLP and the NEC tends to 
fluctuate but there is seldom open conflict. The constitution 
states :
106 McKenzie, pp. 519-524.
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The National Executive Committee and the Execu­
tive Committee of the PLP shall decide which 
items from the Party Programme shall be included 
in the Manifesto which shall be issued by the 
NEC prior to the General Election.107
The NEC has a majority here. This is not to say that the 
PLP is subservient to it or that the NEC is more important 
than the PLP, but simply that the relationship is not always 
simple. Although the PLP is doubltess the focal point for 
policy when Parliament is sitting, when in recess the NEC 
plays a larger role as it usually meets every month. Some 
commentators have argued that when the PLP has been dead­
locked the NEC tended to intervene.!®® If a policy question 
arises in parliament, it has been the custom to leave its 
determination to the PLP. If questions are raised concerning 
this policy in the NEC the party leader or deputy leader who 
are both ex-officio members of the NEC, usually present a 
defence and explanation of the policy and it is left at that. 
There are occasions, however, when the NEC can exert a degree 
of independent influence, as in the case of German rearmament. 
But it might be correct to argue that the areas of independent 
policy initiative left to the NEC are few and that, since the 
composition of both the NEC and PLP, as far as policy attitudes 
go, is usually very similar, the likelihood of divergent and 
irreconcilable opinions emerging is small. When divergent
107 Rose, p. 134.
108 The bulk of the following analysis is adopted from 
Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition". Political Studies. 
IV, no. 2 (June, 1956), I28-I38.
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opinions do emerge they are not usually on matters of funda­
mental policy and can therefore be easily reconciled.
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CONCLUSION
After World War I, the Labour party made a series of 
decisions that resulted in a full-scale commitment to the 
achievement of the Socialist Commonwealth; equality and fra­
ternity were to be sought through the public ownership and 
control of the means of production. The environment in which 
such a transformation could take place had been developing 
throughout the last half of the nineteenth and the early part 
of the twentieth century. Although the party was pluralistic 
there were unified core views that gave it a degree of unity 
which persisted into the post-World War II era. Thus, 
throughout the inter-war years all troubles could be traced 
to one cause: capitalism. But social reformers fall into a 
serious error in assuming that structural changes in society 
are accompanied by what they suppose must be necessary 
changes in human motivation. "Men are conceived of as en­
tirely rational and endowed with a passion for equality. Free 
them from the domination of interests and the degradation of 
a social system which bars equality, and you will have a 
great outpouring of constructive social e n d e a v o r . 1®9 This 
political naivete was even carried to the extreme by the 
Fabians, of considering the possibility of the public owner­
ship of the newspapers to ensure objective reporting.
109 Adam Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English 
Socialism (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 130.
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Doubtless, the realization that the above was not the 
case played its role in the revisionist reformulation. Re­
visionism has made great inroads into Socialist theory, to 
the extent that it is now the dominant theme in British post­
war Socialist thought. This does not mean that other view­
points are insignificant, but it does show that fraternity 
and public ownership as values in the Labour party are no 
longer the most widely accepted core values. In fact, it 
could be argued that core values have been reduced to one: 
equality; although revisionist spokesmen do not rule out the 
possible value of fraternity and public ownership.
This ideological division resulted in the formation of 
two factions within the party which throughout the 1950s con­
ducted a struggle for dominance. Of course, ideological 
factors were strongly reinforced by considerations of power; 
but this does not detract from the major role played by doc­
trine in the conflict.
The nature of the political party as a form of social 
organization operating in the British environment necessitates 
a significant degree of responsiveness, on the part of the 
leadership, to factional demands. Eastonian analysis, if 
adopted, can serve to clarify the general argument. Easton's 
recent work, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.^® can be 
adopted, with certain important modifications, to the analysis 
of political parties and the Labour party in particular. Since
110 (New York, 1965).
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Easton's work is so abstract and general, when an attempt is 
made to apply it to a given political party in a given en­
vironment many arguments which are particularly relevant when 
a broad scope is desired lose their salience.
Demands, Easton argues, can range from very narrow and
111specific ones to those which are very broad in scope.
These will be directed at those members of the party who those 
making the demands believe have the power to satisfy them.
In Labour's case demands are clearly articulated and are 
directed towards the leadership in general, and the leader in 
particular, by the various factions and tendencies in the 
party. General ideologies or vague preferences are not in­
cluded in the term "demand", but these form the basis from 
which real demands emanate. Further, such demands serve a 
functional purpose for the leadership, by providing part of 
the raw material for policy formation and directing the at­
tention of the leadership towards problems of real importance. 
Most demands are the result of experience gained in the non­
political sphere; whether such demands will be brought into 
the political sphere depends on the probability of their being 
fulfilled outside it. Once demands are introduced into the 
political system they act as stresses on the party; if they 
are not fulfilled support for the leadership and even the
111 Demands are defined as "an expression of opinion that 
an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular sub­
ject matter should or should not be made by those responsible 
for doing so." Ibid., p. 38.
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party diminishes. There are likely to be more demands than 
resources; that is, all groups making the demands will not 
be able to receive satisfaction because of the limited values 
available for allocation. If the demands of a significant 
section of the party are not met consistently, support for 
the leadership and the party will be undermined both within 
the party and within the system.
A minimum level of support is necessary if the party is 
to maintain its position in the system or to have a realis­
tic chance of forming the next government, as loss of sup­
port in the party affects party morale and undermines public 
confidence in the party as a viable institution by question­
ing its .ability to govern in a manner comparable to its com­
petitor. If support is persistently below this level, then, 
the party’s survival in its existing form is called into 
question and steps must be taken to reverse this trend. The 
loss of support for the leadership by party members is a 
major cause of stress, and this tends to undermine electoral 
strength. The actions of the leadership play a significant 
part in building up or undermining support. If it cannot or 
will not provide adequate output in the form of policy as 
called for by significant factions and tendencies, cleavage 
will appear and this will result in s t r e s s . W h e n  demands
. 112 Cleavage is defined "either as differences in at­
titudes, opinions and ways of life or as conflict among 
groups ... attitude cleavage and political cleavage." Ibid., 
p. 263.
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are not met support will decline and discontent will mani­
fest itself. Important implications can be drawn from this. 
A simple balancing of interests such as that presented by 
the group process theorists would satisfy neither of the 
major factions; to do this the leadership must swing towards 
the revisionists on some issues and towards the fundamental­
ists on others so that at least a minimum number of the de­
mands of both groups will be satisfied. Secondly, the 
leadership must balance the support and strength gained in 
the party, which indirectly contributes to electoral 
strength, against the possible loss of support in the centre 
of the electoral spectrum when policy becomes too extreme. 
Two elements are necessary: compromise with the Left and 
compromise with the revisionists and/or that section of the 
electorate which gives Labour its margin of victory. The 
degree to which the leadership will lean one way or the 
other depends on many factors, one of the most important 
being the personality of the members of the top leadership 
echelon, as the case of Gaitskell aptly demonstrates.
The greater the degree of internal dissension and con­
flict between party members, the greater will be the degree 
of cleavage. Cleavage can become so great that compromise 
on output becomes impossible; this is an important factor in 
output failure and it destorys support among the electorate. 
While this points out, sharpens and eases identification of 
differences in demand, it increases both the occurrence and 
potentiality for occurrence of conflict. Cleavage results
in output failure, which produces discontent and stress.
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Competing individuals align themselves with like members and 
separate themselves from unlike members, forming factions 
and tendencies; and this interferes with the course of com­
promise and co-operation.
If the leadership is to take any political demand and 
transform it into a policy, and the operation is to be re­
latively smooth, the co-operation, or at least the acquies­
cence, of the major factions is required. Cleavage lessens 
the probability of a successful transformation from input to 
output. If there is no mechanism for the adjustment of 
cleavages in the party, then disintegration will result if 
these continue to increase. Attitudes become excessively 
rigid and compromise becomes increasingly improbable. At 
the extreme, there may be no means of agreeing on who should 
fill the positions of authority, or it may be felt by the 
factions that common membership no longer serves any useful 
purpose. This is a situation which the leadership desires 
to avoid. In addition, the factions compete for loyalty with 
the party and this serves to diminish the effectiveness of 
and support for the party.
Unless there is an effective means of dealing with 
cleavages, stress will increase. Changes in structure may 
facilitate its decrease. Representation may serve as a tool 
to placate members of a faction, and the increased ease with 
which the factions can reach power centres facilitates under- 
standing and flexibility. Representation, formal or informal, 
offers an opportunity to solve differences, assuming that
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communication will serve to facilitate a decrease in cleav­
age. Norms may also have a moderating effect on stress if 
the factions are convinced they must continue to operate 
within the structure. But most important is demand 
satisfaction.
We can expect that direct satisfaction for de­
mands will at least generate specific support; 
and the longer such satisfactions are felt, the 
more likely it is that a higher level of poli­
tical goodwill can develop. If members con­
tinually perceive that their demands are being 
met on a day-to-day basis, their loyalty to ob­
jects can naturally be expected to increase.
As mentioned above, a cancelling out of the desired 
policies of the various factions and tendencies in an effort 
to balance, as the theorists of the group process maintain, 
would not really solve the problem. And it might, in fact, 
hinder the chances of obtaining a greater degree of cohesive­
ness. The leadership would simply be acting as a clerical 
staff while, in reality, they adjust demands or put forth 
new demands which are intended to gain support in the party 
and among the electorate. The leadership evaluates given 
demands but also takes part in the formulation and interpre­
tation of demands in the light of which they feel they will 
gain maximum utility. The policies generated and adjusted 
by the leadership may have several purposes: the maintenance 
of their position vis-a-vis competitors, the increase in 
electoral support as part of the struggle for power, or the
113 Ibid.. p. 275.
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ensurance of maximum "benefit for the party. But whether the 
leadership holds one or all of these, it is almost certain 
the major factor is the maintenance of a certain level of 
support for themselves; and the type of output has the major 
influence on this.
As pointed out before, some leaders, for instance Gait- 
skell, may attempt to maximize support by appealing solely 
to the electors who provide the margin of victory, as opposed 
to other leaders who would tend to place greater emphasis on 
increasing support generally through increasing support among 
party members, believing that the level of support among the 
electors is a function of the level of support in the party.
If, of course, the outputs are favorable to a given 
faction, the leadership will likely go to great lengths to 
point out that this is the case, and the member's percep­
tions of what is being done for them will influence the de­
gree of their support for the leadership. If the policy 
appears to be favorable to certain members, their support 
for the leadership will increase; if not, support will re­
main static or decrease. No matter what the real effect, 
the leadership is likely to make attempts at persuading the 
factions that their demands have been sufficiently met in 
the past. Misperception may be induced by the leadership; 
and it may involve symbolic gratification in place of real 
outputs. These methods, however, are likely to be relatively 
unsuccessful in Labour's case, given the highly sophisticated
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nature of the society and the party. In fact, such methods 
may tend to irritate members, inducing loss of support. The 
relative importance of output is therefore higher than it 
would be in other circumstances.
If the leadership cannot maintain a certain degree of 
support it will no longer be in a position to attain the 
reins of office. Even men with a substantial degree of 
power are not sure how far they can carry their will. 
Generally, the holders of power "are reluctant to test their 
strength any more frequently than is absolutely essential; 
every failure in its use chips away at its future effective­
n e s s " . B u t  historical, social and psychological circum­
stances in the political culture and in the environment 
influence the degree of responsiveness which tends to be in 
almost constant flux.
11^ Ibid.. p. 436.
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